COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY1982). Comparative-historical analysis in sociolo-
gy—and, as we shall see, debate over how it should
be conducted—thus is as old as sociology itself.
PURPOSES, PROMISE, ACHIEVEMENTSThe analytic power of comparative-historical strate-
gies stems from the uniquely paradoxical quality
of the perspectives, data, and procedures in com-
parative-historical research. On the one hand, his-
torical comparisons have the potential to harness
and exploit the huge variation in social processes
and institutions. Some scholars believe this essen-
tial to the development of truly general theory
and to transcultural/transhistorical explanation
(Przeworski and Tuene 1970; Kiser and Hechter
1991). On the other hand, historical comparisons
have the potential to exploit the ‘‘time-space
boundedness’’ of social life and its historical ante-
cedents and specificity. Others view this as equally
essential to theoretical development and to con-
crete, ‘‘real world’’ explanation (Moore 1966;
Skocpol 1984b; Tilly 1984; Stryker 1996). Most
comparative-historical sociologists capitalize in
some fashion on this paradox, finding diversity in
the midst of uniformity and producing regularities
from differences.
One of the great advantages of historical com-
parisons is that they reduce bias induced by cultur-
ally and historically limited analyses and interpre-
tations of the social world. Social structures and
processes in the past were generally quite different
from those observed today, and contemporary
institutional arrangements and social relations dif-
fer substantially across cultures, regions, and states.
Patterns of historical change and continuity, moreo-
ver, have varied from one country or culture to
another. Some scholars, such as Bendix (1963,
[1956] 1974), relish this diversity and use historical
comparisons to emphasize and interpret the pecu-
liarities of each case. Even seeming uniformities
across cases may mask important differences, and
comparative-historical inquiry may be used to de-
tect these ‘‘false similarities’’ (Bloch [1928] 1969).
Examination of historical or national differ-
ences also can lead to the detection of previously
unknown facts that may suggest a research prob-
lem or pose a hypothesis amenable to empirical
exploration. Marc Bloch ([1928] 1969), for exam-
ple, tells of how his knowledge of the English land
enclosures led him to discover similar events in
France. Comparing histories also aids in the for-
mation of concepts and the construction of ‘‘ideal
types’’ (Weber 1949; Bendix 1963; Smelser 1976).
For example, Weber’s ([1904] 1958) concepts of
‘‘the Protestant ethic’’ and ‘‘the spirit of capital-
ism’’ and Wallerstein’s (1974) notion of the ‘‘world
system’’ derive from comparative-historical inquiry.
Linking apparently disparate historical and geo-
graphical phenomena, as Karl Polanyi ([1944] 1957)
does when he relates the gold standard to the
relative geopolitical tranquility throughout much
of the nineteenth century, also is one of the fruits
of comparative-historical analysis. New informa-
tion, conceptual development and the discovery of
unlikely commonalties, linkages, and previously
unappreciated differences are necessary for the
generation, elaboration, and historical grounding
of social theory.The analysis of comparative-historical patterns
can allow for more adequate testing of established
theory than does study of a single nation, culture,
or time period. Plausible theories of large-scale
social change, for example, are intrinsically processual
and so require historical analysis for a genuine
elaboration or examination of their hypotheses
(Tilly 1984). Historical comparisons also can be
used to assess the generality of putative ‘‘univer-
sal’’ explanations for social structure and social
action (e.g., functionalism, Marxism). Abstract
propositions thought operative across time and
space, for example, can be directly confronted
through the analysis of parallel cases that should
display the same theoretical process (Skocpol and
Summers 1980), thereby specifying a theory’s gen-
erality and empirical scope.Comparative-historical analysis sometimes is
directed toward developing explanations that ex-
plicitly are ‘‘relative’’ to space and time (Beer
1963) or that represent historically or culturally
‘‘limited generalizations’’ (Joynt and Rescher 1960).
Skocpol’s (1979) analysis of social revolutions in
France, Russia, and China, for example, resulted
in limited causal generalizations deemed valid for
these three cases only. Exceptions to theoretical
and empirical generality, moreover, can be con-
ceptualized as deviant cases—anomalies or puz-
zles. For example, Werner Sombart ([1906] 1976)
posed the question ‘‘Why is there no socialism in
the United States?’’ precisely because the United