Encyclopedia of Sociology

CONFLICT THEORY

WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONFLICT

GROUP?

For Marx and Engels, a society’s conflicting inter-
ests derive from the division between owners and
nonowners of property. Dahrendorf (1959) pro-
posed that conflicts are based on power, dividing
order-givers, who have an interest in maintaining
the status quo, from order-takers, who have an
interest in changing it. Property is only one of the
bases of power conflict, and conflicts can be ex-
pected inside any type of organization, including
socialist ones. In the Weberian model there are
even more types of conflict, since every cultural
group (such as ethnic, religious, or intellectual
groups) can also struggle for advantage. In addi-
tion, economic conflict takes place in three differ-
ent types of market relations, pitting employers
against workers, producers against consumers, and
lenders against borrowers (Wiley 1967). Gender
stratification produces yet another dimension of
conflict.

THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT

Conflicting interests remain latent until a group
becomes mobilized for active struggle. This occurs
when its members are physically concentrated,
have material resources for communicating among
themselves, and share a similar culture. The high-
er social classes are typically more mobilized than
lower classes, and most struggles over power take
place among different factions of the higher class-
es. Lower classes tend to be fragmented into local-
ized groups and are most easily mobilized when
they are a homogeneous ethnic or religious group
concentrated in a particular place. The better
organized a conflict group is, the longer and more
intensely it can struggle; such struggles become
routinized, as in the case of entrenched labor
unions or political parties. Less organized conflict
groups that become temporarily mobilized are
more likely to be violent but unable to sustain the
conflict.

Overt conflict increases the solidarity of groups
on both sides. Coser (1956), elaborating the theo-
ry of Georg Simmel, points out that conflict leads
to a centralization of power within each group and
motivates groups to seek allies. A conflict thus
tends to polarize a society into two factions, or a
world of warring states into two alliances. This

process is limited when there are cross-cutting

memberships among groups, for instance, if class,

ethnic, and religious categories overlap. In these

cases, mobilization of one line of conflict (e.g.,

class conflict) puts a strain on other dimensions of

conflict (e.g., ethnic identity). Thus, cross-cutting

conflicts tend to neutralize each other. Converse-

ly, when multiple lines of group membership are

superimposed, conflicts are more extreme.

Conflicts escalate as each group retaliates

against offenses received from the other. How

long this process of escalation continues depends

on how much resources a group can draw upon: its

numbers of supporters, its weapons, and its eco-

nomic goods. If one group has many more re-

sources than the other, the conflict ends when the

mobilizing capacity of the weaker side is exhaust-

ed. When both sides have further resources they

have not yet mobilized, escalation continues. This

is especially likely when one or both sides have

sustained enough damage to outrage and mobilize

their supporters but not great enough damage to

destroy their organizational resources for struggle.

Deescalation of conflict occurs in two very

different ways. If one side has overwhelming supe-

riority over the other, it can destroy opposition by

breaking the other group’s organizational capacity

to fight. The result is not harmony but an uneasy

peace, in which the defeated party has been turned

back into an unmobilized latent interest. If neither

side is able to break up the other’s organization,

conflict eventually deescalates when resources are

eaten up and the prospects of winning become

dimmer. Although wars usually arouse popular

solidarity at first, costs and casualties reduce en-

thusiasm and bring most wars to an end within a

few years. Civilian uprisings, strikes, and other

small-scale conflicts typically have fewer resources

to sustain them; these conflicts deescalate more

quickly. During a deescalation, the points of con-

tention among the opponents modulate from ex-

treme demands toward compromises and piece-

meal negotiation of smaller issues (Kriesberg 1982).

Very destructive levels of conflict tend to end

more rapidly than moderate conflicts in which

resources are continuously replenished.

COERCIVE POWER AND REVOLUTION

In a highly coercive state, such as a traditional

aristocracy or a military dictatorship, power is