Encyclopedia of Sociology

CRIMINALIZATION OF DEVIANCE

few people count when it comes to deciding what
is a crime.

WHEN DEVIANCE IS CRIMINALIZED:

POLITICIZATION

As was mentioned earlier, what is deviant is intrin-
sically ambiguous in a complex society whose norms
are changing and whose ethnic mix has varied
values. Criminalization solves the problem of pre-
dictability of response by transferring the obliga-
tion to respond to deviance from the individual
members of society to agents of the state (the
police). But criminalization means that some mem-
bers of society are better able than others to
persuade the state to enforce their moral senti-
ments. Criminalization implies the politicization
of the social control of deviance. In every society, a
political process occurs in the course of which
deviant acts get criminalized. Generally, the politi-
cal leadership of a society criminalizes an act when
it becomes persuaded that without criminalization
the deviant ‘‘contagion’’ will spread, thereby un-
dermining social order (Toby 1996). The leaders
may be wrong. Fidel Castro might be able to retain
control of Cuban society even if Cubans were
allowed access to mimeograph machines and word-
processors. Nevertheless, leaders decide on crimes
based on their perception of what is a threat to the
collectivity. According to legal scholars (Packer
1968), the tendency in politically organized socie-
ties is to overcriminalize, that is, to involve the
state excessively in the response to deviance. Politi-
cal authorities, even in democracies, find it diffi-
cult to resist the temptation to perceive threats in
what may only be harmless diversity and to at-
tempt to stamp it out by state punishment.

Sociology’s labeling perspective on deviance
(Becker 1963; Lemert 1983) goes further; it sug-
gests that overcriminalization may increase devi-
ance by changing the self-concept of the stigma-
tized individual. Pinning the official label of
‘‘criminal’’ on someone stigmatizes him and there-
by amplifies his criminal tendencies. Furthermore,
an advantage of ignoring the deviance is that it
may be ephemeral and will disappear on its own;
thus in 1974 American society virtually ignored
‘‘streaking’’ instead of imprisoning streakers in
large numbers for indecent exposure (Toby 1980),

and by 1975 streaking had become a historical

curiosity. But whether deviance is self-limiting is

an empirical question. The labeling perspective

ignores the logical possibility that stigmatizing the

deviant may be necessary to deter future deviance

by bringing home to the offender (as well as

potential offenders) the danger of antagonizing

the community. In point of fact, the empirical

evidence supports the deterrence possibility more

than it does the amplification assumption (Gove

1980; Gibbs 1975). At its most extreme, the label-

ing perspective denies the desirability of any kind

of criminalization:

‘‘The task [of radical reform] is to create a

society in which the facts of human diversity,

whether personal, organic, or social, are not

subject to the power to criminalize’’ (Taylor,

Walton, and Young 1973, p. 282).

Thus, the labeling perspective flirts with philo-

sophical anarchism. More reasonably, the issue is:

which forms of deviance can be regarded as harm-

less diversity and which threaten societal cohesive-

ness sufficiently that they require criminalization

in order to be contained within tolerable limits?

Experience has taught us that the body odor of

other people, though objectionable to most Ameri-

cans, is tolerable. But what about consuming alco-

hol or cocaine to the point of chronic intoxication?

What about sexual practices that shock most peo-

ple such as sado-masochism or intercourse with a

sheep? One way to finesse these thorny questions

is to define such acts as the product of mental

illness and therefore beyond the control of the

individual. Instead of regarding drug abuse or

alcoholism or bestiality as deviant choices in the

face of temptations, society may choose to regard

them as ‘‘addictions,’’ that is to say, involuntary

(Toby 1998b). Since the ill person is by definition

unenviable, he is not a role model, and therefore

the deviant contagion does not spread (Toby 1964).

But suppose consensus does not exist that these

acts are compulsive; suppose that many people

feel that the perpetrators are perversely choosing to

engage in these behaviors. Average citizens may

become demoralized when they see their norms

flouted or they may be tempted to engage in

the deviant behavior themselves. This is why

criminalization (and state-sponsored punishment)

may be necessary. Punishment serves to deprive