CRITICAL THEORYexplored the relationship between mass produc-
tion as form (e.g., montage as a form of film
production) and political subversion. In contrast
to Horkheimer and Adorno who lamented the
loss of authority in art and the family, Benja-
min welcomed the abolition of traditional sources
of authority and hailed the rapidity of techno-
logical change in mass production as potentially
positive. He interpreted mass production as a
form of mimicry that reproduced existing rela-
tions of authority and domination while lending
itself to potentially subversive reinterpretations
and reenactments of existing social relations and
social meanings (Buck-Morss 1995).
While retaining an analysis of instrumental
reason as a source of domination, Benjamin’s
allegorical approach worked to unveil the forces of
contradiction that were crystallized as promise,
progress, and ruin in mythical modern images.
These images bore the revolutionary potential of
the new to fulfill collective wishes for an unrealized
social utopia contained in a more distant past. At
the same time, they represented progress as the
unrealized potential of capitalism to satisfy materi-
al needs and desires. For Benjamin, images of ruin
represented the transitoriness, fragility, and de-
structiveness of capitalism as well as the potential
for reawakening and a critical retelling of history
(Buck-Morss 1995).
Even though some of the most prominent
founders of the Frankfurt School abandoned radi-
cal social research in favor of an immanent cri-
tique of philosophy (as in Adorno 1973), the lega-
cy of their sociological thought has inspired a
vigorous tradition of empirical research among
contemporary American social scientists. In large
measure, this trend can be seen as a result of the
popularization of Frankfurt School themes in the
1960s, when the New Left stressed liberation and
consciousness raising, themes that continue to
influence sociological practice. Stanley Aronowitz
(1973), for example, along with Richard Sennet
and Jonathan Cobb (1973), have rekindled the
Frankfurt School’s original interests in working-
class culture in the context of consumer society.
Henry Braverman (1974) has directed attention to
processes of reification in work settings by focus-
ing on scientific management and the separation
of conception from labor in modern industry.
Penetrating analyses also have been made of the
impact of commodification and instrumental ra-
tionalization on the family and socialization (Lasch
1977), law (Balbus 1977), education (Giroux 1988),
advertising culture (Haug 1986), and mass media
(Kellner 1990b), as well as other institutional are-
as. Feminist theorists have contributed a ‘‘doubled
vision’’ to critical theory by showing the ‘‘systemat-
ic connectedness’’ of gender, class, and race rela-
tions (Kelly 1979) and by criticizing critical theory
itself for its neglect of gender as a fundamental
category of social analysis (Benjamin 1978; Fraser
1989). Among the most far-reaching and innova-
tive contemporary studies are those of the contem-
porary German sociologist and philosopher Jurgen
Habermas.THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN
HABERMASPerhaps no social theorist since Max Weber has
combined as comprehensive an understanding of
modern social life with as deeply reflective an
approach to the implications of theory and meth-
ods as Jurgen Habermas. Habermas has attempted
to further the emancipatory project of the Frank-
furt School by steering critical theory away from
the pessimism that characterized the closing dec-
ades of Frankfurt School thought. At the same
time, he has resumed the dialogue between em-
pirical social science and critical theory to the
mutual benefit of both. Further, he has given
critical theory a new ethical and empirical ground-
ing by moving its focus away from the relationship
between consciousness and society and toward the
philosophical and sociological implications of a
critical theory of communicative action.
In sharp contrast to the Frankfurt School’s
increasing pessimism about the ‘‘dialectic of en-
lightenment,’’ Habermas has attempted to defend
the liberative potential of reason in the continuing
struggle for freedom. While agreeing with the
Frankfurt School’s assessment of the destruction
caused by instrumental rationality’s unbridled domi-
nation of social life, he nonetheless recognizes the
potential benefits of modern science and tech-
nology. The solution he offers to one-dimensional
thought is thus not to abandon the ‘‘project of
modernity’’ but rather to expand rational dis-
course about the ends of modern society. In order
to further this goal, he has tried to unite science
and ethics (fact and values) by recovering the