DEMOCRACYstakeholders increased access to legal redress, for
example, in class action lawsuits and in environ-
mental litigation. And regarding those within the
organization, one way to understand the manage-
ment trends toward ‘‘total quality management,’’
participatory management, and economic democ-
racy is that they are attempts to increase democrat-
ic participation of workers in decisions that affect
them (Jarley, Fiorito, and Delaney 1997).
Sociologists have often focused on the forms
of influence and participation that individuals have
in decision making. Representative democracy is that
form of governance in which members of the
organization or polity exercise their control over
the organization through the regular election of
members of a decision-making body. It is tradi-
tional to view representative democracies as demo-
cratic because they provide for the expression of
interests through the election of representatives.
For example, in the United States, citizens directly
elect senators and representatives to the U.S. Con-
gress, which in turn makes political decisions about
the actions of the federal government. Theorists
since the Enlightenment have argued that repre-
sentative democracy is an appropriate means for
conveying participation in decision making in large-
size organizations, where individuals are thought
not to be able to participate in all decisions (Hobbes
1968; Locke 1980; Mill 1962; Rousseau 1977).
But this view has been attacked by numerous
critics, many of them sociologists. One of the most
scathing criticisms, building on work by Mosca, is
the analysis of democracy by Michels (Mosca 1939).
Michels’s argument is that in any large organiza-
tion (and, by extension, in any nation-state), a
democratic system of governance inevitably leads
to the rise of an oligarchy, and worse, to an oligar-
chy whose leaders have interests that differ from
those of the ordinary members or citizens (Michels
1949). Why is this inevitable? In every instance of
large democratic organization, Michels argues, oli-
garchy arises as a result of the organization’s re-
quirement for experienced, skilled leaders. Expe-
rience in leadership, however, tends to give leaders
access to key organizational resources, such as
mailing lists, publicity, and greater experience,
that are significant resources that the leadership
can use to return themselves to office year after
year. And as leaders remain in office over an
extended time, their interests and attitudes are
likely to diverge from those of members. The
divergence of interests is a result of the changed
work and social experiences that accrue to leaders.
Hence Michels, while arguing that formal organi-
zation is necessary for social life, and especially for
politics, also believes that democracy in such or-
ganizations is essentially impossible.Michels’s analysis has been taken very serious-
ly in the social sciences, and there is some support-
ing evidence for his propositions. Weber described,
and Heclo and Wilson separately concede, that
there is a tendency for the civil service and bureau-
cracy to become unresponsive to the wishes of
the people, as their experiences and needs differ
from the people (Heclo 1977; Weber 1978; Wilson
1989). Lincoln and Zeitz have shown that as un-
ions tend to get more professional, there is less
member participation in decision making (Lin-
coln and Zeitz 1980). And for both unions and
social movement organizations, Michels’s critique
is taken so seriously as to generate sometimes
drastic proposals for counteracting the oligarchical
tendencies in these organizations (Kochan 1980).
Piven and Cloward argue that reform movements
of the poor should waste few resources on creating
long-lasting organizations, but should instead cre-
ate massive and disruptive protests (Piven and
Cloward 1977).However, Michels is not without his critics.
Nyden argues that democratic unions are possible
(Nyden 1985). Weber himself, who was Michels’s
teacher, was critical of his conclusions. Michels
overstated the case, Weber argued, because he
insisted on relying upon too pure or strict a defini-
tion of democracy. Having started with such an
idealistic vision of democracy, Michels was bound
to find that reality comes up short (Scaff 1981).That too pure a definition of democracy can
lead to a misplaced understanding of how democ-
racy works, and a failure to appreciate its achieve-
ments, is the key assumption behind the most
significant defense of democracy in the 1950s and
1960s—the pluralist account of democracy. Dahl’s