DEPENDENCY THEORYcould be written down and tax obligations re-
duced. In many instances the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) exercised con-
trol and supervision, one consequence of this
action being promotion of political regimes un-
likely to challenge the principle of the loans (So
1990). Chile proved an exception, but one with
disastrous and disruptive consequences. In all cases,
to default would be to undermine those emolu-
ments and privileges accorded local elites likely to
seek further rather than fewer contacts with exter-
nal capital.
Dos Santos’s third form of dependency has
also been widely explored. Landsberg (1979) looked
to Asia to find empirical support. Through an
analysis of manufacturing relationships in Hong
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea with
the industrial West, he concluded that despite
improvement in local circumstances, relative con-
ditions remained little affected due to the domina-
tion of manufacturing and industrial production
by multinational corporations. These corporations
moved production ‘‘off-shore,’’ to Asia or other
less-developed regions, in order to limit capitaliza-
tion and labor costs while selling ‘‘on-shore,’’ there-
by maximizing profits. Landsberg asserted that
because external capital shapes the industrializa-
tion of developing nations, the latter becomes so
specialized as to have little recourse when interna-
tional monopolistic practices become unbearable.
Few more eloquent defenders of the broad
dependency perspective have emerged than Bra-
zil’s Cardoso (1973, 1977). He labeled his render-
ing a historical-structural model to connote the man-
ner in which local traditions, preexisting social
patterns, and the time frame of contact serve to
color the way in which generalized patterns of
dependency play out. He also coined the phrase
associated-dependent development to describe the nur-
turing of circumscribed internal prosperity in or-
der to enhance profit realization on investments
(Cardoso 1973). He recognized that outright ex-
ploitation may generate immediate profit but can
only lead to stagnation over the long run. Indeed,
the fact that many former colonies remain eco-
nomic losers seems to suggest that global develop-
ment has not been ubiquitous (Bertocchi and
Conova 1996). Instead, foreign capital functions
as a means to development, underwriting dynamic
progress in those sectors likely to further exports
but able, as well, to absorb incoming consumer
goods. In the process, internal inequalities are
heightened in the face of wide-ranging economic
dualities as the physical quality of life for those
segments of the population not immediately nec-
essary to export and production suffer as a
consequence.In his analysis of Brazil, Cardoso also broad-
ened the discussion to political consequences of
dependency spurred by capital penetration. His
intent was not to imply that only a finite range of
consequences may occur, but to suggest that local
patterns of interaction, entitlements, domination,
conflict, and so on have a reciprocal impact on the
conditions of dependency. By looking at changes
occurring under military rule in Brazil, Cardoso
succeeded in demonstrating that foreign capital
predominated in essential manufacturing and com-
mercial arenas (foreign ownership of industries in
Brazil’s state of Rio Grande do Sul were so exten-
sive that Brazilian ownership was notable for being
an exception). At the same time, internal dispari-
ties were amplified as interests supportive of for-
eign capital gained advantage at the expense of
any opposition. In the process, wages and other
labor-related expenses tended not to keep pace
with an expanding economy, thereby resulting in
ever-larger profit margins. As the military and the
bourgeoisie served at the behest of multinational
corporations, they defined the interests of Brazil
to be consonant with their own.By the early 1980s the Brazilian economy had
stagnated, and as the country entered the new
millennium it appeared headed for recursive hard
times. Evans (1983) examined how what he termed
the ‘‘triple alliance’’—the state, private, and inter-
national capital interests—combined to alter the
Brazilian economic picture pretty drastically while
managing to preserve their own interests. In an
effort to continue an uninterrupted export of
profits, international capitalists permitted some
accumulation among a carefully circumscribed
local elite, so that each shared in the largess of
favorable political decisions and state-sponsored
ventures. Still, incongruities abounded; per capita
wages fell as GDP increased and consumer goods
flourished as necessities became unattainable. At
the same time, infant and female mortality re-
mained high and few overall gains in life expectan-
cy were experienced. An exacerbation of local