230 S. Drucker and M. Puri
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Todd, P., 1998. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. Review of
Economic Studies 65, 261–294.
Hellmann, T., Lindsey, L., Puri, M., 2006. Building relationships early: Banks in venture capital. Working
Paper, Duke University.
Hellmann, T., Puri, M., 2000. The interaction between product market and financing strategy: The role of
venture capital. Review of Financial Studies 13, 959–984.
Hellmann, T., Puri, M., 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: Empirical Evi-
dence. Journal of Finance 57, 169–197.
Hess, A., Smith, C., 1994. Elements of mortgage securitization. In: James, C. (Ed.), Studies in Financial
Institutions: Commercial Banks. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Hochberg, Y., 2004. Venture capital and corporate governance in the newly public firm. Working Paper, Cor-
nell University.
Hoshi, T., 1996. Bank to the future: Universal banking in Japan. In: Saunders, A., Walter, I. (Eds.), Universal
Banking: Financial System Design Reconsidered. Irwin, Chicago, pp. 205–244.
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., 1999. The Japanese banking crisis: Where did it come from and how will it end?
WBER Working Paper 7250.
James, C., 1987. Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of Financial Economics 19, 217–
235.
James, C., 1988. The use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial banks. Journal of Monetary
Economics 22, 395–422.
James, C., 1995. When do banks take equity? An analysis of bank loan restructurings and the role of public
debt. Review of Financial Studies 8, 1209–1234.
James, C., Weir, P., 1990. Borrowing relationships, intermediation, and the cost of issuing public securities.
Journal of Financial Economics 28, 149–171.
Kanatas, G., Qi, J., 1998. Underwriting by commercial banks: Incentive conflicts, scope economies, and
project quality. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, 119–133.
Kanatas, G., Qi, J., 2003. Integration of lending and underwriting: Implications of scope economies. Journal
of Finance 58, 1167–1191.
Kaplan, S., Minton, B., 1994. Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications
for managers. Journal of Financial Economics 36, 225–258.
Kaplan, S., Strömberg, P., 2001. Venture capitalists as principals: Contracting, screening, and monitoring.
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 426–430.
Kaplan, S., Strömberg, P., 2004. Contracts, characteristics, and actions: Evidence from venture capital analy-
ses. Journal of Finance 59, 2177–2210.
Kelly III, E., 1985. Legislative history of the Glass–Steagall Act, I. In: Walter, I. (Ed.), Deregulating Wall
Street. Wiley, New York, pp. 231–254.
Konishi, M., 2002. Bond underwriting by banks and conflicts of interest: Evidence from Japan during the
pre-war period. Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 767–793.
Kroszner, R., Rajan, R., 1994. Is the Glass–Steagall act justified? A study of the U.S. experience with universal
banking before 1933. American Economic Review 84, 810–832.
Kroszner, R., Rajan, R., 1997. Organization structure and credibility: Evidence from commercial bank secu-
rities before the Glass–Steagall Act. Journal of Monetary Economics 39, 475–516.
Kroszner, R., Strahan, P., 2001. Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability.
Journal of Financial Economics 62, 415–452.
Leland, H., Pyle, D., 1977. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Jour-
nal of Finance 32, 371–387.
Lerner, J., 1995. Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms. Journal of Finance 50, 301–318.
Levine, R., 2004. Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. NBER Working Paper, 10766.
Li, X., Masulis, R., 2004. Venture capital investments by IPO underwriters: Certification or conflict of inter-
est? Working Paper, Vanderbilt University.
Liberti, J., 2002. Initiative, incentives and soft information: How does delegation impact the role of bank
relationship managers? Working Paper, London Business School.