THE IMPOSTOR SYNDROME 95planning to his actions than was probably the case, El - Sayed ‘ more
or less fooled all of Swedish society — politicians, businessmen, fi nan-
cial analysts, fi nancial journalists ’ (Wittebort, 1987 , p. 96). In the
aftermath, ever yone realized that what he sold was dreams and prom-
ises, that the stock price of Fermenta rose to a large extent on air and
not on substance, and that far from being a high - tech fi rm, his
company was really a very ordinary factory. El - Sayed ’ s persuasive-
ness, combined with the added inducement of the greed of others,
enabled him to get the attention of everyone.
Meanwhile, Fermenta ’ s stock price took off phenomenally. At the
end of 1985, it was trading at 213 compared with an introduction
price only a year and a half earlier of 21.25. With 44% of the stock
(79% of the voting rights), El - Sayed had become the richest man in
Sweden, at least on paper. El - Sayed reached the zenith of his career
in January 1986 with the announcement of a spectacular deal. With
Volvo ’ s backing, Fermenta would take the lead in consolidating
Sweden ’ s pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry, thereby gaining
control over some of the major players in the fi eld. It was soon after
this announcement that an innocuous - looking article in an obscure
paper appeared questioning whether El - Sayed really had obtained a
doctorate.
For many, this small deception was hard to take. After an initial
reaction of disbelief, those involved started to take a closer look at
El - Sayed ’ s various activities. The Volvo deal fell through and the
‘ socialist dream, ’ as El - Sayed had been called because of his ability
to play a capitalist game with a socialist touch, tumbled rapidly from
his pedestal. An increasing number of irregularities were revealed,
including long - ter m contracts w ith payments booked up f ront, capita l
transactions recorded as profi ts, buy - back arrangements of Fermenta
shares at guaranteed profi ts, and loans given to El - Sayed himself
for other questionable transactions. Industriv ä rden, an investment
company affi liated with Svenska Handelsbanken, discovered that
Fermenta ’ s assets were vastly overvalued.
It was also discovered that some of Fermenta ’ s profi ts were gener-
ated by deals that never existed. El - Sayed had taken a more than
active role in managing Fermenta ’ s stock price. A true master of the
media, he had played his rags - to - riches story for all it was worth.
Every journalist willing to listen had received stories about future
deals, mergers, and acquisitions, announcements that infl uenced
Fermenta ’ s stock price.
However, it seems El - Sayed saw no wrongdoing in his actions.
Like many entrepreneurs, he had had diffi culty establishing the