LESSONS FROM THE ‘WILD EAST’ 291lingering Oblomovian outlook is the absence of a national work ethic
( ‘ We pretend to work; they pretend to pay us ’ ).
In a number of the companies I visited, the Oblomovian outlook
still prevailed. For the most part, the negativity of that outlook was
grounded in reality: these companies were doing very poorly; in some,
the workers had not been paid for long stretches of time, getting by on
the barter system. However, some people at a number of these companies
were making a heroic effort to sweep lingering Oblomovism aside,
taking a more proactive attitude in an effort to create a meaningful work
environment. In general it was easier to co - opt the younger people into
taking a more proactive stand. Many of the older workers found it dif-
fi cult to overcome their disbelief in a better future.
‘ Bureau Pathology ’
Russian bureaucracy, often corrupt and ineffective, was fi rst consoli-
dated around 1700 under the rule of Peter the Great and reached a
summit in the last phase of communism. The vast and venal bureaucracy
was like a foreign invading force strangling the population. The State
Planning Committee — an army of bureaucrats known by the acronym
GOSPLAN — drafted plans in Moscow for every economic unit in the
country, micro - managing behavior without a full realization of the
various constraints placed on these economic units.
The excess of meaningless rules and regulations found under the
Communist Party (and still largely in effect today) can be interpreted as
‘ social defenses ’ — a way of dealing with persecutory and depressing
anxiety ( Jaques, 1955 ; Menzies, 1960 ).^1 In other words, the Russian
people furthered an already excessive bureaucracy in an attempt to deal
with the angst and unpredictability of life under the communist regime,
and with the glaring contradictions between espoused theory and theory
in practice (particularly when Stalin was in power). Every new rule or
regulation, every additional protocol (a written record of a transaction,
meeting or statement of intent) created the illusion of certainty. Although
at a subliminal level Russians were aware of the meaninglessness of the
whole exercise, the dysfunctional bureaucracy served a purpose: bureau-
cratic routines and pseudo - rational behavior obscured personal and
organizational realities, allowing people to detach from their inner
experiences, thereby reducing anxiety.
These social defenses are still very much present, albeit not as strong
today as they were at the height of communism. This ‘ bureau pathologi-
cal ’ element in Russian society contributes to the Russian perception