much differently than the schemata of the occupational knowledge
domain. The knowledge units of the self-knowledge domain are
structured according to episodes (Tulving, 1972, 1984), whereas
occupational knowledge is structured according to semantic hier-
archies from concrete to ever-more-abstract concepts. The former
memory store (episodic memory) consists of networks of events in a
temporal-spatial continuum that are not externally verifiable, whereas
the latter memory store (semantic memory) consists of schemata in
the form of networks of facts, concepts, and relationships among con-
cepts that are verifiable in external reality. The ways in which life
episodes are accumulated and integrated in episodic memory consti-
tute a higher-order abstraction—our self-concept. Episodic memory
units, integrated and stored in the self-knowledge domain, make our
life’s experience and behavior comprehensible and predictable,
whereas semantic knowledge units in the occupational knowledge
domain make the occupational world comprehensible.
The acquisition of self-knowledge involves two fundamental
processes: (1) the interpretation of events and (2) the reconstruc-
tion of events. Interpretation involves the matching of sensations
of present events with episodes already stored in LTM; these epi-
sodes contain subjects, actions, objects, outcomes, and affective ele-
ments. A match between a present event and an episode stored in
LTM strengthens the schemata associated with the present episode.
Related episodes are linked across time to form aspects of our self-
concept. Thus, according to schema theory (Rummelhart & Ortony,
1976), an individual who has a long history of episodes in which he
sees himself as performing in a dominant manner would, as a conse-
quence, likely see himself as possessing a personality trait of domi-
nance. Reconstruction involves interpreting past events to fit present
events in one’s social context. In perceiving a present event, we draw
on existing schemata in the self-knowledge domain to comprehend
the situation. In the process, we may reconstruct past events in order
to assimilate new data (Neisser, 1981, 1982). Thus each time a pres-
ent event triggers an association to episodes in the past, we may not
only reconstruct our past in a subtle way but shape our self-concept
A COGNITIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH 321