Atheism and Theism 121general principle which the counter-examples give reason to reject. I described
my argument as an adaptation of the first way. Interpreting the latter as
I have done here shows that the ‘Prime Thinker’ argument is a case of it,
made special by also invoking the principle that the cause of conceptual
activity must itself be conceptually active, or more generally (and slightly less
misleadingly) the cause of thinking must itself be a thinking thing.
What gives warrant to the latter principle? First, it is supported by the idea
that the induction of conceptual ability is an intentional activity and there-
fore is expressive of purposeful intelligence in which ends are conceived. This
is a matter of the form of the cause (i.e. ‘acting’) and it will apply wherever
intentional ‘making to be’ is involved. Second, however, there is a special
feature of the case in question which concerns the content of the process. As
James teaches Alice the use of the term ‘cat’, in a context, say, where there are
particular cats – Angus and Big Feet – James makes these objects intelligible
to Alice. He raises them from the sensible level to the sphere of ‘thinkables’.
Previously Alice could see Angus and Big Feet but she could not think of
them as things of the same sort; that and much else besides is what concept-
acquisition brings. Concept-induction is an intentional form of making intel-
ligible. Thus while the earlier principle (∀x) (∃y) (if x comes to be F, then y
is F and y makes x to be F ) is not unrestrictedly true, I claim it is true where
the value of F is ‘a thinker’.
Leaving the particularities of the ‘Prime Thinker’ proof to one side, the
first three of the five ways might be abbreviated as follows:
I (1) In nature some things are changing.
(2) Anything changing is changed by another.
(3) This sequence cannot go on for ever.
(4) Therefore, there is an unchanging first cause of change.
II (1) In nature causes and effects are found ordered in series.
(2) If there were no prior cause there would be no series.
(3) This sequence cannot go on for ever.
(4) Therefore, there is an uncaused first cause.
III (1) In nature some things are contingent.
(2) Anything contingent is caused to be by another thing.
(3) This sequence cannot go on for ever.
(4) Therefore, there is a necessary first cause of things.
From what little expository analysis I have offered it should be clear that
there remains scope for dispute about the correct representation of Aquinas’s
arguments, but I would ask you to draw back from that and consider the
main issues raised by these proofs. As I noted earlier these are the questions