Reply to Smart 173philosophical physicalism turns out to have its own non-material objects,
namely space–time points, numbers and sets. Just how far his views are removed
from pre-philosophical thought is made clear when he observes that ‘If Quine
is right [which Smart takes to be so] we must regard the mathematical objects
as physical, and yet they are not material’ (chapter 1, p. 10).
Let me repeat that here I am not challenging these opinions, let alone
criticizing Smart for holding them. The point is rather to highlight the fact
that in making his case for atheism he relies upon a range of controversial
metaphysicalclaims. There is no scope, therefore, for his rejecting theism on
the grounds that, as contrasted with philosophical atheism, it is committed to
strange and extravagant ideas. Ontological commitments are tied to descript-
ive and explanatory theses; more prosaically, we have to allow the existence of
what is implied by our best attempts at understanding. And as Smart notes in
his original essay, it is a highly contextual issue whether an explanation is
simple or complex, economical or extravagant. Our situation as opponents in
the debate about atheism and theism, therefore, is that we are in the same sea,
if not in the same boat, using broadly similar nautical methods, but drawing
different conclusions about the layout of the oceans and about the best direc-
tion in which to proceed.
At the outset of his essay Smart affirms the principle that ‘an important
guide to metaphysical truth is plausibility in the light of total science’ (chapter 1,
p. 6 – my emphasis) and he goes on to explain that he means ‘science’ to be
understood in a very broad way. This qualification is necessary if the charge of
narrow scientism is to be avoided. Yet his methodological principle may still
harbour some unwarranted assumptions about what qualifies as knowledge
and understanding. For example, Smart lists as sciences history, archaeology
and philology; in other words spheres of investigation of human actions,
artefacts and meanings. But if we are concerned with understanding aspects
of the personal then it may be that there are no law-like scientific principles
to be had, only interpretations the forming of which may rest on non-discursive
intuitions and emotional reactions.
This consideration touches on an old issue in philosophy, namely the
distinction between explanation by reference to causal regularities, and under-
standing in terms of comprehended meanings. The German philosopher
Dilthey (1833–1911) investigated the ways in which in interpretation one
draws upon ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis) and human ‘understanding’ (Verstehen)
in order to describe, evaluate and make one’s way through the ‘life-world’
(Lebenswelt).^2 Abstracting from Dilthey’s terminology the basic idea is clear
enough. If we are after understanding, then we have to deploy the resources
of our humanity; we have to let ourselves see and feel as human animals
and not restrict our methods to those of a science which aspires to an ideal
of describing the world in an observer-free way. Thus, to the extent that