Atheism and Theism 83of conception, discernment and inference have been exercised in socially shared
and continuous histories of scientific enquiry in order to get us to the stage
we are at today.
Stability, regularity and intelligibility in world and mind are underlying
assumptions of even the most limited claims of scientific realism. But suppose
we ask what reason we have for making these assumptions. The general
answer cannot be that they are conclusionsof scientific enquiry, since they
are part of what makes it possible. Rather we should say that assumptions
concerning the intelligibility of objects and the intelligence of subjects are
preconditions of empirical enquiry revealed by reflection on thought and
practice. This recognition raises a number of issues including that of whether
such preconditions serve to establish the existence of a God. I shall examine
this in due course; but for now I only want to observe that science involves an
absolutely fundamental and extensive commitment to the nature of reality;
one that is presupposed rather than derived from it; and one that makes
ineliminable reference to the idea that what there is is intelligible.
So viewed, it should now seem odd to oppose scientific and religious ways of
thinking about the nature of reality. On the contrary, it is plausible to regard
them as similar; for a central idea of theism is that we and the world we
inhabit constitute an objective order that exhibits intrinsic intelligibility. What
is added is the claim that both the existence and the intelligibility of this
order call for an explanation and that this is given by reference to a mindful
creator. Thus science is faith-like in resting upon ‘credal’ presuppositions, and
inasmuch as these relate to the order and intelligibility of the universe they
also resemble the content of a theistic conception of the world as an ordered
creation. Furthermore, it seems that the theist carries the scientific impulse
further by pressing on with the question of how perceived order is possible,
seeking the most fundamental descriptions-cum-explanations of the existence
and nature of the universe.
It will not do to respond that this further search is unscientific, for that
is simply to beg the question against the theist. Assuming that by ‘science’
we understand investigation of and theorizing about the empirical order,
then properly scientific attitudes and interests are certainly compatible with
theism. Indeed the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic doctrine of creation serves to
underwrite science by assuring us that its operative assumptions of order and
intelligibility are correct and by providing a motivation for pure science,
namely understanding the composition and modes of operation of a vastly
complex mind-reflecting artefact.
Let us pursue this approach a bit further. Smart’s version of scientific
realism is reductionist. He dismisses a familiar version of the design argument
on the grounds that the apparent teleology of living systems is explicable
by reference to the blind and purposeless operations of evolution – random