14 Leaders The Economist December 18th 2021
T
wo yearsinto theirterms,governmentsoftenlanguish.But
any supporters of Boris Johnson who may be tempted to fall
back on that excuse for the increasingly feeble grip of his pre
miership would be guilty of selfdelusion. Britain’s prime min
ister is facing a double crisis. One half of this is the growing
sense that he is temperamentally unfit to hold the highest office
in the land. The other is the fear that his government will be in
capable of bringing about the reforms it has promised—some of
which Britain badly needs.
The depths of Mr Johnson’s difficulties became clear on De
cember 14th, when 99 Conservative mps voted against his “Plan
B” to deal with the Omicron variant. It was one of the largestever
rebellions against a Conservative prime minister and it put Mr
Johnson in the unsustainable position of de
pending upon the opposition Labour Party for
one of his government’s central policies. Two
days later, as The Economist went to press, voters
were about to have their say in a byelection in
North Shropshire, the truest of blue seats. A col
lapse of the Conservative majority looked as
sured. There was even the possibility of defeat.
Whatever the verdict in North Shropshire,
Mr Johnson is looking personally wounded. He has always been
accidentprone, but he has usually matched this with an extraor
dinary knack for wriggling out of trouble. When lesser politi
cians bluster and contradict themselves, voters sneer at their
sleaze, lying and hypocrisy. By contrast, Mr Johnson has had an
uncanny ability to make them feel as if they are in on the joke.
But his greatest political gift is failing him. First, sleaze cut
through to ordinary voters. In November Mr Johnson tried to
save Owen Paterson, then mpfor that North Shropshire seat,
from being censured for breaking the rules over paid lobbying.
(The prime minister said that to punish him would offend natu
ral justice.) The next to cut through was lying. This month it
emerged that, whereas Mr Johnson had claimed to know noth
ingaboutwhopaidfora renovationofhis Downing Street flat,
which cost £112,549 ($150,000), he had in fact been asking for
money from the man who turned out to be the donor. (Number
10 says that appearances are deceptive.) And most recently it was
hypocrisy. A video showed senior aides joking about one of sev
eral parties held in Downing Street last Christmas, when the rest
of the country was locked down with only the television for
company. (Mr Johnson said he knew nothing of it.)
What matters more to Britain than the fact that the prime
minister’s spell over voters has broken is his government’s di
minished capacity for reform. Mr Johnson’s pitch in the election
of 2019 was that postBrexit Britain would no longer be a divided,
unequal country. Power and prosperity would flow from the
metropolitan elite to leftbehind places that
would be “levelled up”. His was a radical new
type of Conservatism, popular but not populist.
The revolution never happened, and not just
because the pandemic got in the way. Brexit
stumbles on, zombielike, in an endless strug
gle over the future of Northern Ireland. Policy
making has seized up or, as with reforms to
planning law, been abandoned altogether. A
campaign to warn against the dangers of Scottish independence
has died. Levelling up has come to encompass everything, so it
means nothing. True, a drive to weaken judicial oversight, limit
free speech and protest, and make the police less accountable
trundles forward. But such illiberalism is hardly a glorious tri
bute to Britain’s postBrexit sovereignty.
The viciousness of Omicron could yet vindicate the urgency
behind Plan B (see International section). The lack of a Tory chal
lenger—and of a strong opposition—could win Mr Johnson re
election in 2024. Even so recent weeks mark a new phase in his
premiership. Once lost, voters’ trust is hard to recover. When a
government and its party are ragged, they are hard toreunite. If
reform loses focus and purpose, it is hard to jumpstart.n
A rebellion in Parliament is just the start of the prime minister’s difficulties
Broken promises
Britain’s government
I
n christmas1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Mikhail
Gorbachev, its last leader, said that, even if the future was un
certain, at least “we have...abandoned the practice of interfering
in others’ internal affairs and using troops outside the country.”
Thirty years later Russia, the heir to the old Soviet Union, is
once again in the business of interfering abroad. In Vladimir Pu
tin, it is run by a man who splenetically regrets the dissolution
of the ussr. Mr Putin particularly resents the way two Slavic
states, Ukraine and Belarus, slipped from Moscow’s control (see
Essay). He has recently reasserted a large degree of influence ov
er Belarus, after its electionrigging despot turned to him for
help. And he is massing troops on Ukraine’s border—over
70,000 of them, complete with supply lines, field hospitals and
the prospect of reinforcements. American intelligence fears that
he could invade Ukraine soon. What can be done to deter him?
Ukraine’s armed forces, though better than they were when
Mr Putin first started biting chunks out of their country in 2014,
are not nearly strong enough to stop a Russian invasion. Nor is
there any chance that natocountries will intervene militarily to
defend Ukraine. They do not, and should not, want a war with a
nucleararmed Russia. However, there are ways to raise the costs
to Mr Putin of invading.
The West must raise the costs to the Kremlin of invading Ukraine
How to deter Vladimir Putin
Russia and Ukraine