30 Asia TheEconomistDecember18th 2021
entreasonsforleavingthecountry,sug
gestingbotheconomicimprovementsin
placesbeyondPyongyangandagrowing
awarenessoflifeintheoutsideworld.“In
earlieryearspeoplewouldsaytheywere
fleeingtosurvive;nowmostsaytheyfled
forfreedom,”saysSokeelParkofLibertyin
NorthKorea,anngoinSeoulthathelps
NorthKoreansreachtheSouth.
MrKim’s“fatherandgrandfatherbuilt
their identity around conflict, suffering
andsacrifice,”saysJennyTownoftheStim
sonCentreinWashington.“Hedidn’thave
that,sopromisingpeoplea betterlifewas
analternativewaytobuildlegitimacy.”Yet
theboundariesofthat“betterlife”have
beengraduallyconstrictedinrecentyears.
ThepointofitwastomakeMrKim’srule
morestable.Itdidnotextendtoallowing
anythingresemblingarealmarketecon
omyorgrantingmorepoliticalfreedomsto
ordinarypeople.
Andit hasbeenaccompaniedbyheight
enedrepressioninsidethecountry,tighter
controlofthebordersandaccelerationof
the nuclear programme started by Mr
Kim’spredecessors,notablythroughtests
of intercontinental ballistic missiles
which,NorthKoreaclaims,arecapableof
reachingAmerica.Theinternationaleco
nomicsanctionsimposedontheNorthto
slowdownthenuclearprogramme,which
werestrengthenedin 2017 afterthosetests,
leftMrKimwithlittlemoneytoadvance
goalsotherthanbuildinguphisarsenal.
MrKim’sattemptstoresolvethatcon
tradictionbycourtingMrTrumpandMoon
Jaein,SouthKorea’spresident,endedin
failure.DuringhismeetingwithMrTrump
inHanoi,hemiscalculatedbydemanding
comprehensive sanctions relief from
AmericainreturnfordismantlingYong
byon, an important but ageing nuclear
plant.MrTrump,whoprideshimselfon
hisabilitytodrivea hardbargain(andhas
littlepatienceforworkingleveltalks),re
buffedMrKim,causingtalkstocollapse.
That might have been manageable,
sinceMrKim’sotherdiplomaticovertures
inthisperiod,notablytoChina,hadslight
lymoresuccessandensureda steadyflow
oftrade,bothlegalandillicit.Butwhenthe
pandemicstruck,MrKim’sresponseput
paidto that,too(see chart).Theborder
withChinahasbeenclosedforthebest
partoftwoyears.Despiterecentrumours
ofa limitedopening,itislikelytoremain
sofortheforeseeablefuture.Tourism is
moribund. Mostforeigndiplomatshave
left.Aidorganisationsarelockedout,mak
ingit difficultforanyonetodiscernwhatis
goingoninsidethecountry.
There are hints of growing distress,
witheventheprivilegedinPyongyangsuf
feringfoodshortages.MrKimhimselfhas
admittedthatthefoodsituationis“tense”
andurgedhispeopletoprepareforhard
ship.Buthehasalsoincreasedpenalties
forsmuggling,andforwatchingforeign
entertainmentsuchasSouthKoreandra
mas.Hecontinuestorebuffoffersofaid
andevencovidvaccines.CallsbySouthKo
reaandAmericatoreviveaspiritofde
tente,suchasbynegotiatinga formalend
totheKoreanwar,havegoneunanswered.
That suggests that Mr Kim has lost
hope,atleastfornow,thatbuildingbridges
withAmericaanditsalliescanimprove
things,reckonsMsTown. Hewillprobably
shifthisfocusbacktowardsrelationswith
Syria,IranandVenezuela,fellowpariahsto
which North Koreahas sometimes sold
weaponstoraisehardcash.
If it ain’tbroke...
TradewithChina,too,islikelytoresume,if
slowly,aspandemicrestrictionsinboth
countries are loosenedoverthecoming
years.WesterncountriesandSouthKorea
mayfindthemselvesatthereceivingend
notofdiplomaticoutreach,butofransom
wareattacks,cryptocurrencytheftandes
pionage perpetrated by North Korea’s
increasingly sophisticated statespon
sored cybercriminals. Combined with
currentlevelsofpoliticalrepression,such
measuresarelikelytobeenoughtokeep
NorthKorea’seconomyafloat.
Giventhat eventhe grimstatus quo
looks,fornow,survivable,it willbehardto
muster upenticements to coaxMrKim
backtothetabletodiscussarmscontrol.
Of 82 NorthKoreaanalystspolledrecently
bynkPro,a researchoutfitbasedinSeoul
andWashington,apluralityof 31 recom
mendedthatAmericashouldacceptthat
persuadingthepaunchydictatortogiveup
hisnuclearweaponswasa lostcause,and
engageinsustaineddiplomacythatisnot
contingent onhisagreeing to renounce
them.Butthereislittleappetiteforthat
amongAmericanpoliticians.
Tenyearson,the“economicallypower
fulstate”MrKimsetouttobuildremainsa
mirage. Hecan at leastconsole himself
withhisyachtsandthecontinuinggrowth
ofhis nucleararsenal. Hispeople,alas,
havenosuchluxury.n
Banishing act
North Korea-China trade, exports, $m
Source:GeneralCustomsAdministrationofChina
400
300
200
100
0
100
200
300
2017 21201918
NorthKorea
toChina
China to
North Korea
Strongest sanctions announced
against North Korea
Covid-1 emerges
in China
PoliticsinthePacific
Rule of three
“F
rance is morebeautiful,” Emman
uel Macron, its president, said on De
cember 12th, “because New Caledonia has
decided to stay part of it.” The French terri
tory, some 17,000km away from Paris in the
Pacific Ocean, emphatically rejected inde
pendence earlier that day by 96.5% to 3.5%.
It was the last of three referendums laid
out in the Nouméa Accord of 1998, a com
pact designed to end bitter conflict be
tween the islands’ loyalist politicians and
the largely indigenous and proindepen
dence Front de Libération Nationale Kanak
et Socialiste (flnks). The result is a turna
round from the previous two polls, when it
seemed as though proindependence sen
timent was gaining strength. In the first, in
2018, 43.3% voted “oui” to independence;
in the second, two years later, 46.7% did.
The reason was not a sudden surge in
affection for l’Hexagonebut a collapse in
turnout—the 44% of eligible voters who
showed up amounting to barely more than
half the 86% at the previous ballot in Octo
ber 2020. The flnkshad argued for a delay
to the poll after a recent Delta wave that
killed one in 1,000 residents, mostly Pacif
ic Islanders. A perception that delaying the
vote would boost the odds of indepen
dence no doubt played a role in the flnks’s
call for postponement, too. The govern
ment in Paris insisted on sticking to the ap
pointed date, to avoid criticism from na
tionalists in the runup to the French pres
idential election in April. Proindepen
dence campaigners boycotted the vote.
The French government dismissed the
WELLINGTON
New Caledonia says no to
independence, again
The nons have it