The Economist December 18th 2021 Asia 31
I
t was, in much of Asia, not a good year
for fair, free and open societies.
“Democratic recession”, the phrase used
by some analysts, does not really do
service, especially in so motley a region.
It is too clinical, eliding the profound
human impact of lurches towards au
thoritarianism. It is also too optimistic:
“recession” has embedded in it the no
tion of a bottom in the cycle, with inev
itable recovery. In much of Asia, that is a
heroic assumption.
Brutally so in Myanmar. Its army chief
seized power in a coup in February and
has since ruled through terror. Not only
has General Min Aung Hlaing wiped out
years of fragile democratic gains. With
dogged ignorance he attempts to stuff his
country back into some prelapsarian
mould of discipline, order and benevo
lent military rule. In reality his troops
slaughter unarmed citizens as foreign
investors flee and the economy im
plodes. Far from pulling Myanmar to
gether, he is hastening its dissolution.
Myanmar becomes the second coup
led military dictatorship in SouthEast
Asia, joining nextdoor Thailand. It, too,
is under a (nowretired) general of lim
ited intelligence, Prayuth Chanocha, the
prime minister. One of the bleaker jokes
of the past year is that General Min Aung
Hlaing turned to Mr Prayuth for advice
on building a flourishing democracy.
The ten countries of the Association
of SouthEast Asian Nations also include
two Leninist dictatorships, Laos and
Vietnam (three, if, tongue in cheek, you
include Singapore); an absolute mon
archy, Brunei, with whippings and am
putations as potential punishments; and
a dirtpoor autocracy, Cambodia, where
Hun Sen, in power for nearly 37 years,
dispenses favour with the munificence
of an emperor of yore in Angkor.
As for the region’s nominal democ
racies, in the Philippines, President Rodri
go Duterte has assaulted the judiciary and
the press. In Indonesia President Joko
Widodo, known as Jokowi, uses internet
laws to silence critics and has defanged
the anticorruption commission. Malay
sia’s reform movement has succumbed to
the same grubby dealmaking as the cor
rupt former ruling party, which it dis
lodged from power in 2018. In 2021 some of
the reformists joined that party to form a
new government.
In South Asia, even less joy. A drug
running theocracy seized power in Af
ghanistan. In Sri Lanka President Gota
baya Rajapaksa and his brothers continue
transforming the state into a family fief.
And in India the prime minister, Narendra
Modi, hounds critics, stokes sectarian
tensions and hollows out Parliament’s
supervisory functions. The irony of his
imperialscale plans to reshape New Delhi
is in plain view: the old parliament build
ing is to become a museum of democracy.
The pandemic has only emboldened
authoritarian tendencies. But, to revert to
financial metaphors, even if a cyclical
recovery is not inevitable, there is still
scope for secular improvement. Parlia
mentary systems are embedded in
enough Asian countries to allow demo
cratic consolidation to reassert itself
after strongman rule. India, after all,
recovered from the Emergency, Indira
Gandhi’s dictatorship between 1975 and
1977. Elsewhere, work by Don Lee of
Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul and
Fernando Casal Bértoa of the University
of Nottingham suggests that the accre
tive habits of democratic elections help
keep the worst instincts of past authori
tarianism at bay. For all Jokowi’s back
sliding, future elections in Indonesia are
likely to remain fair.
Above all young Asians offer hope.
They are sick of rigged political systems,
graftbased economies and poor job
prospects. In 2022 Malaysia is a country
to watch. New automatic voter registra
tion and a lowering of the voting age will
swell the electorate by over a third.
As for the influence of outside pow
ers, perhaps it is exaggerated. Authoritar
ian China has not been the democracy
undermining force some in the region
feared. Indeed Taiwan, the main object of
China’s bullying, is a rare democratic
beacon. By the same token America’s
rhetorical promotion of democracy, to
say nothing of its summitry, does not
resonate widely: Asian liberals know the
priority for American democracy is not
to lead but simply to hang on.
For all that, more stable democracies
elsewhere can help in practical ways,
such as by supporting independent
media. When Maria Ressa won the Nobel
peace prize, even Mr Duterte, who has
hounded her and her brave news website,
Rappler, was forced to congratulate her.
Count that, in 2021, as a success.
Democracy declined across Asia in 2021, but there are ways that it can revive
Banyan Down and to the right
turnout as legally irrelevant. In the past, it
had presented itself as a neutral arbiter in
the dispute between the territory’s loyalist
and proindependence politicians. This
time was different. A 100page government
document released before the poll warned
of dire economic consequences if New Cal
edonia seceded. Abandoning the reticence
of his predecessors, the French Minister
for Overseas Territories, Sébastien Lecor
nu, unexpectedly pitched up in New Cale
donia the day before the referendum,
sending a clear message of French reluc
tance to cede control.
Geopolitics played a role in the antiin
dependence campaign, too. New Caledo
nia has around a tenth of the world’s nickel
reserves. The metal accounts for 90% of ex
ports, mostly to Asia. Loyalist parties ar
gued that an independent New Caledonia
would become a Chinese vassal state.
Mr Macron hopes that the result will
render the Nouméa Accord void, ending
what he calls the “binary choice” between
independence and staying part of France.
“We must now build a common project,
while recognising and respecting the dig
nity of everyone,” he said. Yet key elements
of the devolved structure agreed on in the
accord, including a powersharing agree
ment between the loyalist and proinde
pendence parties, will remain in place.
Proindependence parties, for their
part, refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy
of the latest ballot. They have shunned Mr
Lecornu’s postreferendum overtures for
negotiations for a new political settle
ment, though these, too, are required un
der the Nouméa Accord. In the background
lurks the impending contest fortheFrench
presidency. Until then, Mr Macronislikely
to be in no mood for concessions.n