18 Holiday specials The Economist December 18th 2021
author Eric Posner argue that the method could poten
tially work well in organisations large and small, from
the United Nations to presidential elections, from
shareholder meetings to homeowner associations. By
their reckoning, it would also have left Mr Trump trail
ing Mr Kasich in 2016. Vitalik Buterin, cofounder of a
blockchain platform called Ethereum, has used simi
lar principles to govern his cryptocommunity’s deci
sionmaking. He describes it as “an initial foray into a
fundamentally new class of social technology”.
In principle, this social technology gives people a
reason to express, but not overstate, the intensity of
their feelings. To see how that works, imagine that one
voter would happily part with $1,000 if it would magi
cally guarantee their candidate a victory. A second
more passionate supporter would pay twice as much.
They both calculate that casting an extra vote will in
crease the odds of victory by the same small percent
age (say 1%). And they privately value each voice credit
at the equivalent of about $1 (even if they cannot liter
ally sell them for money).
The first voter enters the poll. Since a vote increases
the chance of their candidate winning by about 1%, it is
worth roughly $10 in their mind (1% of $1000). The first
vote, which costs only one credit or the equivalent of
$1, is a bargain. So is the second, third and fourth. By
the time they have cast five votes (for a combined cost
of 25 credits), a sixth would cost 11 credits (six squared
is 36, which is 11 more than 25). That is the equivalent of
$11. So it is not worth buying.
The more passionate supporter values each vote at
$20. Once they have cast ten votes (for 100 credits), an
eleventh would cost them an additional 21 credits. So
they limit themselves to ten. That is twice as many as
the first supporter, accurately reflecting the fact that
they care twice as much about the issue.
The result could be quite different under a simpler
system of onecreditonevote. If each vote cost a flat
one credit, the passionate voter would snap them up,
until they had exhausted their budget, or until victory
was so assured an additional vote was not worth buy
ing. The other, milder supporter might do the same, in
which case the result would fail to differentiate be
tween them. Or, knowing that stronger supporters
were blowing their budgets for the cause, the milder
supportermightnotbothertobuyanyvotesatall. That
wouldagainmisrepresenttheirtruefeelings.
Distinguishingstrongfrommildsupportisequally
valuableinopinionpolling.In 2016 DavidQuarfoot of
theUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiegoandhis coau
thorsputtencontroversialpolicyproposalsto 4,850
Americanvoters.Theyincludedproposalstoraise the
minimum wage, deport illegal immigrants, repeal
Obamacareandtaxtherich.Someofthevoters were
askedtorespondona conventionalscale(fromstrong
lyapprovetostronglydisapprove).Othersweregiven a
budgetof 100 voicecreditstospendquadratically.
Intheconventionalsurvey,peopletendedto gravi
tatetooneendofthescaleortheother.Theyexpressed
strongapprovalordisapproval,justasonlinereview
erstendtogivefivestarsornone.Inbothcases, a
strongstatementcostsnothing.Inthequadratic poll,
peoplefaceda constraint.Expressingvehemence on
oneissuerequiredthemtoweakentheirstand on an
other.Thisconstraintforcedthemtobemorediscern
ingabouttheirpassions.
qv,see
MrWeylsuggestedthemethodtoChrisHansen, who is
nowa statesenatorinColorado.TheDemocratic legis
latorsusedqvtohelppickwhichofmanypossible
spendingbillstheyshouldpushintheyearahead. It is
alsousedinTaiwantohelpdecideamongtheinnova
tionscookedupintheannualPresidential“Hackath
on”,whichchallengescivicentrepreneurstouse data
toimprovepublicservices.InBrazilthecitycouncil of
Gramadohasalsousedquadraticvotingtosetits prior
itiesfortheyearandtofindconsensusontaxamend
ments.It isa waytogobeyond“thesimplicityof yes or
no,”saysProfessorDaniel,thecouncil’spresident. “At
firstwefacedsomescepticism,wefounditstrange,”
hesays.Butafterthecouncillorsweretrained,“every
oneunderstoodtheidea,whichisthesearchfor con
sensus,fora democracyofthefuture.”
Quadraticvotingdoessoundstrange.Likethe cau
cusraceinWonderland,the“bestwaytoexplain it is
todoit”.AndsoTheEconomistisinvitingreaders to
takepartinanonlinequadraticpoll(seethelink at the
endofthisarticle)modelledontheexperiment by Mr
Quarfootandhiscoauthors.Theproposalsinclude:
shouldcountriesimposea carbontax?Shouldthey le
galiseassisteddying?ShouldBritainreverseBrexit?
Youcanexpresshowyoufeelabouttheseproposals,
andhowstrongly,bytakingpart.
MrPosnerandMrWeylhavebigdreamsfor their
moderationmachine.Theyimaginea worldin which
citizenswouldspendfroma lifetimebudgetof voice
creditsonregularreferendums.Anindividualwho felt
stronglyabouta singleissuecouldhoardtheircredits
untilitsmomentarrives,thenblowalloftheir saved
creditsonit.Thatwouldallowpassionateminorities
occasionallytooutvoteindifferentmajorities.
Inthisvision,voterscouldenterandexitelectoral
contestswhenthespiritmovesthem.Inthat way it
wouldresembleCarroll’scaucusrace.Andsince even
minoritiescouldoccasionallyprevailoverquadrati
callyconstrainedmajorities,everyonecouldwinat
somepoint.AstheDodosaid,“Allmusthaveprizes.”n
Even
minorities
could
occasionally
prevail over
quadratically
constrained
majorities
To take part in The Economist's quadratic poll,
visit Economist.com /QuadraticPoll