the idea that the subsidiaries are overpriced. For parents, we report short
interest divided by total shares outstanding. For subsidiaries, we report
short interest divided by total shares sold to the public in the IPO, since
these shares are the only ones trading in the market.
Table 4.5 shows that on the first reporting date after the IPO, the par-
ents had an average of 3.7 percent of their shares shorted. The sub-
sidiaries had a significantly larger short interest of 19.1 percent. A month
later, on the second reporting date, 43.4 percent of subsidiary shares were
shorted. This dramatic increase over time could be produced by some
combination of two factors. First, it may take a while for investors to be-
come aware of the mispricing and decide to try to exploit it. Second, and
more plausibly, the short-sale market works sluggishly. Only shares that
are held by institutions willing to lend them are available for interested
short-sellers, and it takes time for lendable shares to find their way to the
market for shorting.
Table 4.5 also shows the peak level of short interest for subsidiaries, for
the time between the IPO and the distribution date. At the peak, short sales
are 79.5 percent of total shares trading, and for Palm the level is an amaz-
ing 147.6 percent. More than all the floating shares had been sold short.
This is possible if shares are borrowed and then sold short to an investor
who then permits the shares to be borrowed again. Again, the multiplier-
type process takes time to operate because of frictions in the securities lend-
ing market. This peak level of short interest for Palm was reached on July
14, 2000, two weeks before the announced distribution, at a time when the
stub was positive but rising.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show short interest (expressed as a percentage of
total shares issued) and stub value (expressed in dollars per parent com-
pany stock price) for Palm and Stratos over the relevant period. The figures
show that as the supply of shares available grows via short sales, the stub
value gets more positive. One might interpret this pattern as roughly trac-
ing out the demand curve for the overpriced subsidiary. As the supply of
shares grows via short sales, we move down the demand curve of irrational
investors and the subsidiary price falls relative to the parent.
Although quantity data in the shorting market are readily available, price
data are not. We do not know precisely what the cost of shorting the over-
priced subsidiaries was. We do have scattered evidence for four of the six
subsidiaries. D’Avolio (2002) reports maximum borrowing costs of 50 per-
cent (in annual terms) for Stratos Lightwave in December 2000, 35 percent
for Palm in July 2000, and 10 percent each for PFSWeb in June 2000 and
Retek in September 2000.^6
Given these high lending fees, it might seem surprising that it took so
long for owners to offer their shares to the lending market. This apparent
152 LAMONT AND THALER
(^6) With the exception of Stratos Lightwave (which has a distribution date occurring after
D’Avolio’s sample ends), all these dates are on or near the distribution date.