122 Hippocratic Corpus and Diocles of Carystus
Aurelianus is referring concerns the so-calledhegemonikon ̄ orregale. This
term is probably of Stoic origin (c.300 b c e) and refers to the ‘leading’
principle in the soul (commonly indicated asnousorintellectus, which is
usually translated as ‘thought’ or ‘intellect’). The use of this term implies
the possibility of grading various psychic parts or faculties, some of which
are subordinate to others, and presupposes an anatomical and physiological
relationship underlying such a hierarchy. On the one hand such a presen-
tation presupposes a rather elaborate psychological theory, free from the
difficulties and obscurities that, for instance, Aristotle points out when he
discusses the psychological views of his predecessors in the first book of his
On the Soul(De anima). It will be clear that a presentation such as that
by Caelius Aurelianus, in which all doctors and philosophers are called to
the fore to express their views on the matter, puts opinions in their mouths
that many of them (probably) never phrased in these terms. On the other
hand, such a presentation does not do justice to thinkers such as Aris-
totle and some authors of the Hippocratic Corpus, as it often obscures the
subtle differences in meaning between the various terms used for psychic
faculties by these thinkers. We will see below that as early as the fifth and
fourth centuriesbce, doctors and philosophers carefully differentiated be-
tween cognitive faculties such as ‘practical’, ‘theoretical’, and ‘productive
thinking’; ‘insight’; ‘understanding’; ‘opinion’; and ‘judgement’.^9 Indeed,
the possibility of location was a matter of dispute too. Thus Aristotle was
credited in late antiquity with the view that ‘the soul’, or at least its leading
principle (thearche ̄), is seated in the heart. We will see that this is a mis-
representation of Aristotle’s views, which, strictly speaking, leave no room
for location of the highest psychic faculty, thenous. Similarly, the author
of the Hippocratic workOn Regimen(at the start of the fourth century
bce) presupposes a view of the soul that does not specify where exactly it is
located in the body; he even appears to assume that the location may vary.
In short, this doxographic distortion attributes to doctors and philosophers
answers to questions which some of them would not even be able or willing
to answer as a matter of principle.
Finally, Caelius Aurelianus upholds a long tradition of contempt for
the so-calledphusiologia. This tradition dates back to the author of the
Hippocratic writingOn Ancient Medicine(c.400 b c e). He was opposed
to some of his colleagues’ tendency to build their medical practice on
general and theoretical principles or ‘postulates’ (hupotheseis) derived from
(^9) Aristotle lists a range of terms for cognitive faculties (nous,phronesis ̄ ,epistem ̄e ̄,sophia,gnom ̄e ̄,sunesis,
doxa,hupolepsis ̄ ) in book 6 of theNicomachean Ethics; however, it remains uncertain to what extent
the subtle differences in meaning that Aristotle ascribes to these terms are representative for Greek
language in general.