148 Aristotle and his school
Another notable remark on the physiology of the melancholic (Insomn.
461 a 23 – 4 ) is that melancholy, fever and drunkenness are ‘spirituous
affections’, withpneumatod ̄es ̄probably meaning ‘containing/producing air’
(cf.On Sense Perception(De sensu, Sens.) 445 a 26 ). The fact that drunk-
enness and melancholy are mentioned together, and are both said to be
‘pneumatic’ in character, will be discussed below, when I deal withPr. 30. 1
(for the connection between wine andpneumaalso cf.Somn. vig. 457 a
16 ). With regard to the question of the melancholic ‘constitution’, it is
worth noting that the use of the wordpathospoints to melancholy as a
disease rather than a natural predisposition. However, it may well be that
Aristotle chose the wordpathosto refer to fever and drunkenness, without
considering the difference (viz. that both are affections that occur sporadi-
cally, whereas melancholy is a predisposition) relevant in this context, and
therefore did not discuss it.
There is a direct relation between the passages fromOn Divination in
Sleepand the remark in theEudemian Ethics( 1248 a 39 – 40 ) about the
euthuoneiriaof melancholics. It is mentioned as an example of the way
in which people who lack reason and deliberation (logosandbouleusis),
by means of divine movement in their soul can still be successful in their
actions and do the right thing.^35 This divine movement is probably identical
to the mechanism that Aristotle calleddaimonia phusisinDiv. somn. 463
b 15.^36 It is again striking that melancholics are categorised as belonging
to the group of ‘irrational people’ (alogoi, aphrones) and that a relation is
perceived between their lack of reason and their prophetic powers.
3 melancholy in the nicomachean ethics
In the seventh book of theNicomachean Ethics,melancholics are mentioned
on three occasions. In his treatment of lack of self-control (akrasia, 1150 b 19 )
(^35) Eth. Eud. 1248 a 39 – 40 : ‘This entity [i.e. God] sees both the future and the present well, even
in people whose reasoning faculty is disengaged; this is why melancholics have clear dreams, for
it seems that the principle works more strongly when reason is disengaged’K$[i.e. !]
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(^36) For the interpretation of this difficult chapter, and for an assessment of the differences between the
views inEth. Eud. 8. 2 andDiv. somn., see ch. 8 below. With regard to the passageEth. Eud. 1248 a
39 – 40 , the remarks made by Flashar ( 1962 , 713 and 1966 , 60 n. 2 ) should be noted. Flashar argues
that there is a contradiction betweenEth. Eud. 1248 a 39 – 40 andInsomn. 461 a 22 – 4 with regard to
the ‘clear’ and ‘vague’ images melancholics see in their dreams. However, he does not seem to have
noticed that the relationship betweenEudemian EthicsandOn Dreamsis the same as betweenOn
Divination in SleepandOn Dreams. His explanation is that this contradiction may have something
to do with the fact that Aristotle later, in theParva naturalia, denies that dreams could be of divine
origin, something Aristotle considered possible in theEudemian Ethics, which may well be earlier.
In my opinion this explanation is not correct, asOn Divination in Sleepalso says that melancholics
have clear dreams.