Aristotle on the matter of mind 233
but whose existence, however marginal their importance may be, Aristotle
recognises as interesting and in need of explanation^89 – an explanation
which invokes the principle that even within the category of ‘what is con-
trary to nature’K3 1 -
Lthere is such a thing as ‘according to
nature’K3 1 -
L.
However much this may seem to be applauded, it remains unclear how
these gradualist and compensatory explanations should be accommodated
within the ‘normative’ theory ofDe an. 3. 4 – 8 , for in explaining all these
variations by reference to bodily variables he seems to grant physical condi-
tions a greater influence on intellectual activities than his ‘canonical’ view
of the incorporeality ofnouswould seem to allow.
To be sure, it may be asked whether there is actually such a tension, for it
might be argued that all instances of bodily influence on intellectual activ-
ity discussed above can be classified under the rubric of the ‘dependence of
the intellect on appearances’.^90 Yet even if this is true, we still have gained
a much more detailed view on how this dependence may work out in par-
ticular cases, what may go wrong in the supply of images to the intellect
and what range of bodily factors may actually influence this supply, and
indeed not only the supply but also the quality of images, and even the act
of thinking itself. Whether this affects the thesis of the incorporeality of the
intellect, remains to be seen.^91 One way in which it would not do so, is to
assume that the bodily influences only apply tolowerlevels of intellectual
activity such asdoxa(‘opinion’),hupolepsis ̄ (‘supposition’),dianoia(‘discur-
sive thought’), not tonous, or to ‘practical’ not ‘theoretical’ intellect, or to
‘passive’ not ‘active’ intellect.^92 This is a problematic solution because, as is
well known, it is not easy to see how the various terminological distinctions
between intellectual powers that Aristotle makes are related to each other,
and we have also seen that the passages on bodily influence do not seem
to be very specific with regard to the precise intellectual power they are
(^89) On all these phenomena, and their place in Aristotle’s philosophy, see ch. 5 in this volume,
pp. 164 ff.
(^90) This seems to be the view taken by most interpreters who have dealt with (some of ) the passages
I have discussed; see, e.g., Kahn ( 1992 ) 366 n. 11 onDe an. 408 b 9 : ‘In mentioning bodily change
in connection with thinking, Aristotle must be referring to phantasms’; Tracy ( 1969 ) 272 ff.; and
Verbeke ( 1978 ) 201 – 2 with n. 55.
(^91) See Aristotle’s uneasiness about this inDe an. 403 a 8 – 10.
(^92) See Kahn ( 1992 ) 362 – 3 : ‘It is not the disembodied principle ofnousthat requires phantasms; it is
our use ofnous, the penetration ofnousinto our embodied activity as sentient animals, which must
take place by means of the phantasms, that is, through the neurophysiological mechanism of sense
and the mental imagery of conscious thought.’ A distinction between
and seems
to be implied inDe an. 408 b 24 – 5 , although Aristotle is very tentative (cf. the use ofA)in b 29 ).
On different modes of thinking see also Lowe ( 1983 ) 17 – 30.