236 Aristotle and his school
It is perhaps significant that passages like the ones discussed were used
by writers such as the Peripatetic author of thePhysiognomonica– who
may well have been Aristotle himself – in support of their assumption of
the fundamental correspondence between mental dispositionsK
L
and bodily statesK
/
4
L;^100 again, the
worddianoiais used here, although it is very difficult to decide whether
it refers to intellectual capacities alone or has a wider meaning of ‘mental
dispositions’ (as the sequence of the passage inPhysiognomonicashows,
where the author refers to :or just to:L.Tobe
sure, in thePhysiognomonicaintellectual capacities are rarely referred to,^101
and the author mainly deals with moral dispositions and characteristics.
He refers to stock examples such as drunkenness and illness, and he also
uses love, fear, pleasure and pain as examples of how emotional states
may influence the condition of the body, thus indicating that there is a
reciprocal relationship between body and soul.^102 In doing so, the author
is in accordance with genuine Aristotelian doctrine, for example with what
we read about the bodily aspects of emotion inMovement of Animals,
where Aristotle says that heat and cold may be causative – in the sense of
‘efficient causality’ – of emotions, or accompaniments of emotions, but he
also acknowledges that emotions in their turn may produce heat or cold in
the body.^103
Thus to dismiss works such as thePhysiognomonica(and parts of the
Problemata) as un-Aristotelian^104 on the strength of their alleged ‘mate-
rialistic’ doctrine of the soul and of the intellect in particular, ignores
the presence of a number of passages in genuine Aristotelian works in
which very similar views are being expressed.^105 The purpose of the present
chapter has been to draw attention to these passages and to encour-
age students of Aristotle’s psychology and ‘philosophy of mind’ to take
them into more serious consideration. In particular, it should be asked
to what extent these passages present a challenge to the doctrine of the
(^100) Phgn. 805 a 1 ff.; cf. the ancient commentaries onDe an. 403 a 16 referred to above (n. 53 ). On
physiognomics see Barton ( 1994 ), ch. 2 (with abundant bibliography).
(^101813) a 29 ; 813 b 7 ff. Cf. 808 b 10. (^102805) a 3 ff.
(^103) De motu an. 701 b 17 ff.; 702 a 3 ff.
(^104) I have occasionally referred to passages in theProblematain the footnotes to show how certain
tenets vaguely alluded to in Aristotle’s genuine works are elaborated there, although I am aware that
this work is of a later date; the question of to what extentProblematacan be used to reconstruct
Aristotelian views on which the authentic works provide only fragmentary information deserves
further examination.
(^105) See Solmsen ( 1950 ) 463 – 4 , who uses the word ‘materialistic’ in connection with the passages inPart.
an. 648 a 2 ff. and 650 b 19 ff. about the cognitive role of the blood.