chapter 8
Divine movement and human nature in
Eudemian Ethics 8. 2
InEudemian Ethics(Eth. Eud.) 8. 2 Aristotle is searching for an explanation
ofeutuchia( (), which might be defined as ‘good fortune’ – sheer luck
in matters in which the lucky man does not have any rational or technical
competence, befalling the same man so frequently that it cannot be a
matter of coincidence.^1 Textual problems, extreme brevity and looseness of
expression as well as the enormous span of the argument make it difficult
to follow Aristotle’s reasoning in detail. Yet there seems to be a consensus
among modern interpreters concerning the conclusion of the chapter. The
principal question was whethereutuchiais caused by nature or not ( 1247
a 2 ), and Aristotle’s answer to this question, briefly summarised in 1248 b
3 – 7 , is as follows. There are two forms ofeutuchia, the first of which is
both ‘divine’ (theia) and ‘by nature’ (phusei),^2 and the second of which is
caused by ‘chance’ (tuch ̄e); both forms are ‘irrational’ (alogoi), but the first
form is ‘continuous’ (sunech ̄es), whereas the latter is not. The first form is
the one which Aristotle has been trying to explain from the beginning; the
existence of the second form he was compelled to recognise in the course
of his argument.
It appears that this first form ofeutuchiais based on a kind of interaction
between a principal divine movement ( 1248 a 25 ff.) and a human natural
constitution ( 1248 a 30 – 1 ; 39 – 41 ). Thus the explanation ofeutuchiainvolves
a rather specific conjunction of two factors, nature (phusis) and God (ho
theos), which at an earlier stage of the argument ( 1247 a 23 – 31 ) – and also in
the first chapter of theEudemian Ethics( 1214 a 16 – 24 ) – were distinguished
among others as two different possible causes ofeutuchia. This conjunction
This chapter was first published inHermes 117 ( 1989 ) 24 – 42.
(^1) Actually Aristotle nowhere explicitly defineseutuchia, since the explanation of the phenomenon
consists for a substantial part in trying to attain such a definition. For an analysis of Aristotle’s
argument see Woods ( 1982 ) 176 ff.; and Mills ( 1981 ) and ( 1983 ).
(^2) Spengel’s conjecture in 1248 b 4 (8 . @-
), adopted by Susemihl ( 1884 ), is no longer accepted by
modern interpreters. On ‘chance’ (-#) as the cause of the second form see Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) 492 ;
Gigon ( 1969 ) 211.
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