Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 239
is in accordance with an assertion inNicomachean Ethics(Eth. Nic. 1179 b
21 – 3 ); the part played by ‘nature’ (phusis) as a possible cause of ‘excellence’
(aret ̄e), Aristotle says there, is ‘not within our control, but is present in
those who are truly fortunate (eutuchesin) through certain sorts of divine
causes’.^3
The problem to be discussed in this chapter concerns the discrepancy
between these two stages ( 1247 a 23 ff. and 1248 a 25 ff.) of the argument in
Eth. Eud. 8. 2 .In 1247 a 23 ff. Aristotle suggests as a possible explanation of
eutuchiathat it is caused not by nature (phusis) but by a god or demon:
or because they [i.e. these ‘fortunate’ people] are loved, as people say, by a god, and
the cause of their success is something external: just as a ship that has been built
badly often sails better not because of itself, but because it has a good navigator,
likewise the fortunate person has a good navigator.^4But this explanation is immediately ruled out by the following objection:
but it is paradoxical that a god or demon should love such a person rather than
the best or the wisest. ( 1247 a 28 – 9 )^5It is obvious that Aristotle is thinking here of the popular concept of a
personal guardian deity or demon.^6 It is evident that his rejection of this
conception as a possible explanation ofeutuchiais not inconsistent with his
own final conclusion thateutuchiais ‘divine’ (theia) and happens ‘through
God’ (dia theon).^7 But the problem is that it is far from evident in what
way this final conclusion is proof against the objection stated in 1247 a
28 – 9 about the distribution of the phenomenon among different groups
of people (‘but it is paradoxical.. .’," 5 ' .), for in his final
conclusion Aristotle explicitly asserts that God is ‘moving more strongly’ in
people who are ‘without reason’ (alogoi) than in those who practise reason,
intellect and rational deliberation (logos, nous, bouleusis, 1248 a 32 – 4 ; 40 – 1 ).^8
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(^6) On this popular conception see D ́etienne ( 1963 ) 129 – 30 and Hanse ( 1939 ) 8 – 12.
(^7) See von Fragstein ( 1974 ) 375 ; Mills ( 1982 ) 206 ; von Arnim ( 1929 ) 12 ; and von Arnim ( 1927 ) 130 ,
who argues that there is an inconsistency between 1247 a 23 – 31 and 1248 a 32 ff. and accounts for
this inconsistency by arguing that these passages represent different stages in the development of
Aristotle’s ideas.
(^8) See Bod ́e ̈us ( 1981 ) 55 n. 44 : ‘La principale difficulte vient peut- ́ etre moins d’une conception selonˆ
laquelle Dieu pourrait intervenir dans les affaires humaines (ce dont la doctrine dunousdans laM ́et.
xiine semble pas envisager les modalites) que de l’id ́ ́ee selon laquelle pareille intervention serait,
contre toute logique, en faveur des faibles d’esprit exclusivement.’