322 Late antiquity
combining accurate observation of a patient’s symptoms with a moderately
strong theoretical apparatus.^83
Yet here, too, the picture is more complicated. First, the question arises
of in what way the Methodist attitude to experience was different from
that of the Empiricists; for we find Caelius, perhaps somewhat surpris-
ingly, on several occasions speaking very scornfully aboutexperimentum,
experience, as it was used by the Empiricists. It is also unclear to what
extent the Methodists nevertheless allowed for a selective use of theoretical
reasoning;^84 for we often see Caelius appealing to reason (ratio) not only
in polemical contexts (where he criticises the therapies proposed by other
people or schools for their ‘lack of reason’) but also when he sets forth his
own course of treatment.
As forratio, however, it is important to specify in what sense this word
is used:
(i) One category of usages are polemical contexts, where Caelius wishes to
reveal the absurdities and irrationalities of the therapeutic ideas of other
physicians, as in the following passages:
( 30 ) dehinc sine ratione ad dierum numerum cibum dandum putat [sc. Diocles].
(Acut. 2. 29. 155 )
Then without reason he [i.e. Diocles] holds that food should be given in accordance
with the number of days.
( 31 ) quae omnia, ut ratio demonstrat, sunt acria et propterea tumori contraria.
(Acut. 2. 29. 156 )
All these measures, as reason proves, are sharp and therefore opposed to the
swelling.
In both passages, Caelius is criticising Diocles – a ‘Rationalist’ authority –
for lack of rationality in his therapeutic instructions. There are several other
passages in which other Dogmatists are criticised on the same grounds:
their therapeutic, in particular their pharmacological recommendations are
dismissed by Caelius for beingsine ratione,^85 ornullius rationis,^86 orcontra
(^83) For a characterisation of the difference between Methodists and Empiricists see Frede ( 1987 a)
270.
(^84) On the Methodists’ use of reason, i.e. their acceptance of ‘truths of reason’, see Frede ( 1987 a) 265 ff;
for their use of reason as an instrument of refutation see Lloyd ( 1983 ) 190 ; for a critical reaction
see Gourevitch ( 1991 ) 69. I should stress that my discussion of reason and experience in Caelius
Aurelianus lays no claim to comprehensiveness; a much more thorough investigation of all the
relevant passages is very desirable.
(^85) E.g.Acut. 2. 19. 121 ; 1. 16. 165 (against Themison); cf. 2. 9. 49 (against Themison); 3. 8. 97 (against the
Empiricists);Chron. 5. 2. 48.
(^86) E.g.Acut. 1. 16. 157 ; cf. Soranus,Gyn. 1. 46.