48 Hippocratic Corpus and Diocles of Carystus
does not concern a discrepancy between religious theory and religious prac-
tice or between theology and cult, but a tension between different ideas in
one and the same text. For there is a difference between intellectuals simply
participating (from habit or under social pressure) in cultic actions, and
intellectuals, such as the author ofOn the Sacred Disease, making explicit
statements and definitions about what they believe should be the right way
of approaching the gods. Moreover, the author’s assertions not only con-
cern cult and ritual, but also characteristics of the divine and the way in
which it manifests itself within human experience. Therefore the problem
deserves to be considered, and we must try to find out how these two sets
of religious opinions are related to each other.
I shall first deal with the statements on the divine character of the disease
and consider whether these admit of being extrapolated into a ‘theology’.
This will for a substantial part consist in an attempt to evaluate and clarify
the interpretative debate on the author’s claim that ‘all diseases are divine
and all are human’. Then I shall deal with the statements in his chapter 1
and relate these to the assertions about the divine character of the disease.
Finally I shall summarise my conclusions concerning the religious notions
which can, with some degree of certainty, be attributed to the author ofOn
the Sacred Disease.
2 the divinity of diseases
In spite of the vast literature on this subject (see n. 5 above) we may say
that basically there are two different interpretations of the use of the words
‘divine’ (theios) and ‘human’ (anthropinos ̄ ) with regard to diseases inOn
the Sacred Disease, both of which have a strong textual basis.^11 I do not
reasons? On this question see Gigon ( 1952 ) 127 – 66 , esp. 128 – 9 and 156 – 64 , and Vlastos ( 1952 ) 104 and
112 – 13. (ii) To what extent were intellectuals at liberty to hold and propagate advanced ideas about
religious matters? On the one hand it is often stated that there was no institutionalised orthodoxy in
ancient Greece and no sacred books with authorised interpretations and that, consequently, many
different religious beliefs were tolerated (see Lloyd ( 1979 ) 10 – 15 ). On the other hand it cannot be
denied that at the end of the fifth century (in Attica at least) a growing intolerance manifests itself,
e.g. in the trials of ‘impiety’ (asebeia). In this respect it is significant that it is the author ofOn the
Sacred Diseasehimself who accuses his opponents of impiety and atheism ( 1. 28 ff.; 1. 39 ff.), charges
which later (in the fourth century) were frequently connected with magic (e.g. in the trials ofasebeia
againt Ninos and Theoris). (iii) Did this apparent intolerance only concern participation in cult and
ritual, or did it concern religious ideas as well? On all these matters see Bryant ( 1986 ); Dover ( 1975 );
Fahr ( 1969 ); Guthrie ( 1969 ) vol.iii, 226 – 49 ; Meijer ( 1981 ); Mikalson ( 1983 ) 91 – 105 ; Sandvoss ( 1968 )
312 – 29 ; Versnel ( 1990 ) 123 – 31.(^11) For this reason I shall not discuss as a separate alternative the view that the author ofOn the Sacred
Diseasehas adopted the idea of the divinity of air from Diogenes of Apollonia (cf. H. W. Miller ( 1953 )
9 – 15 ), though I shall say something about this in the course of my comments on interpretation ( 1 ).
On the influence of Diogenes on this treatise see Grensemann ( 1968 c) 29 – 30.