On the Sacred Disease 49
intend to offer a new one, but I believe that the debate would benefit from
recognising that these interpretations are different and incompatible, and
from acknowledging the presuppositions underlying both views. My second
a prioriremark is that the use of terminological oppositions such as ‘rational
versus irrational’ and ‘natural versus supernatural’ in order to define the
meaning oftheiosandanthropinos ̄ is confusing rather than illuminating.^12
The correct questions to ask are, first, in which respect (or, in what sense) a
disease, according to the author, is to be regarded as divine or human, and,
second, what connotations or associations oftheiosandanthr ̄opinosenable
the author to apply these words to a disease.
The two interpretations are as follows:
( 1 ) A disease is divine in virtue of being caused by factors (prophasies;on
this term see below) which are themselves divine: the climatic factors
heat, cold and winds. These can, on this view, be called divine because
they are beyond human control (the author acceptingaporos, ‘hopeless’,
‘impossible to resolve’, as a proper associate oftheios,cf. 1. 3 – 4 , 6. 352
L.).^13 The disease is human in virtue of being caused by other factors
as well which are ‘human’, such as the particular constitution-type of
an individual, the constitution of his brain, his age, and so on. These
factors can be called human because they (or at least some of them) are
capable of being controlled, or in any case influenced, by human agency.
( 2 ) A disease is divine in virtue of having aphusis, a ‘nature’, that is, a defi-
nite character and a regular pattern of origin (cause) and growth ( 13. 13 ,
6. 368 L.:
). The governing connotations oftheios
(^12) This is not to suggest that the oppositions ‘rational–irrational’ and ‘natural–supernatural’ are used
by modern scholars as if they were equivalent, but rather to avoid the anachronistic associations
these terms conjure up. Cf. the frequent use of ‘rational–irrational’ in N ̈orenberg ( 1968 ), e.g. 71 :
‘Damit bekommt das wie die
́ einen rationalen Charakter, der die Kritik an jeder ir-
rationalen Auffassung und so auch an den des Mythos und des Volksglaubens, bzw. dem
ganzlich irrationalen ̈
!
provozieren muss’; and Kudlien ( 1974 )passim. A more cautious use
of ‘natural–supernatural’ is to be found in Lloyd ( 1979 ) e.g. 26 – 7 ; but even with regard to the use
ofphusisinOn the Sacred Diseasethis opposition creates a distinction which is not to the point,
since the term ‘supernatural’ does not apply to the position that the author ofOn the Sacred Disease
combats.
(^13) In 1. 3 – 4 ( 6. 352 L.) the author discusses the possible reasons why people came to regard epilepsy as
a sacred disease. One of these reasons, he says, may be the ‘hopelessness’ ("#) with which the
disease confronted them. But he proceeds to show that this only applies to a cognitive ‘hopelessness’
("# $ %
); as for the therapeutic aspect, he says, these people claim to be ‘well
provided’ with means to cure ( &
) rather than ‘hopeless’ ('
). Cf. the distinction between
two respects of ‘hopelessness’ made in 13. 13 ( 6. 368 L.): (
")# * ' ) &
+
& *
(‘and it [i.e. the disease] is not more hopeless than the others, neither as far
as curing nor as far as understanding it are concerned’). Apparently the author acceptsaporosas
a justified associate oftheios, but he points out that these people are actually notaporoiat all. By
showing that the disease is caused by ‘human’ factors as well (which are in their turn influenced by
the divine factors mentioned) the author demonstrates that in his account a disease can be both
divine and human (i.e. both divine and curable).