54 Hippocratic Corpus and Diocles of Carystus
chapter 13 the same expression is used (the wording of the whole sentence
13. 13 is closely similar to that of 18. 1 – 2 ),^23 and since in chapter 13 the author
has discussed the influence of winds, it seems safe to conclude that the same
restriction is intended in 18. 1.
Fourthly, this interpretation requires that the wordtheiosin 18. 2 is used
in two different ways without this shift of use being marked explicitly in the
text. First, in the sentence ‘these things are divine’, it indicates an essential
characteristic of the things mentioned, but in the following sentence it is
attributed to the disease in virtue of the disease’s being related to divine
factors. This need not be a problem, sincetheiosin itself can be used in
both ways; but it seems unlikely that in this text, in which the sense in
which epilepsy may be called ‘divine’ is one of the central issues, the author
permits himself such a shift without explicitly marking it. The point of this
‘derived divinity’ becomes even more striking as the role assigned to the
factors mentioned here is, to be sure, not negligible but not very dominant
either. Admittedly, the influence of winds is noted repeatedly and discussed
at length (cf. 10. 2 , 6. 378 L.; ch. 13 ); but the effects of heat and cold can
hardly be said to play a dominant part in the author’s explanation (see
above). This may also help us to understand the use of the wordprophasis
here; for if the writer ofOn the Sacred Diseaseadheres to a distinction
betweenprophasisandaitios, withprophasisplaying only the part of an
external catalyst producing change within the body (in this case particularly
in the brain),^24 this usage corresponds to the subordinated part which these
factors play in this disease. Then the statement about the divine character
of the disease acquires an almost depreciatory note: the disease is divine
only to the extent that climatic factors play a certain, if a modest part in
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(^24) This is suggested by the use ofaitiosandprophasisin 3. 1 : ‘the brain is causally responsible (aitios)
for this affection, as it is for the greatest of the other affections; in what manner and through
what cause (prophasis) it occurs, I am going to tell you clearly’ (" 1 1 A
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0 F ) ).Cf. 10. 4 , 6. 378 L.; 10. 7 , 6. 380 L.). But the whole
question, especially the meaning ofprophasis, is highly controversial. N ̈orenberg ( 1968 ), discussing
the views of Deichgraber ( ̈ 1933 c) and Weidauer ( 1954 ), rejects this distinction on the ground that,
ifprophasishad this restricted meaning, then ‘durfte der Verfasser bei seiner aufkl ̈ ̈arerischen Ab-
sicht und wissenschaftlichen Systematik gerade nicht so viel Gewicht auf dieprophasieslegen,
sondern er musste vielmehr von den “eigentlichen” ̈ aitiaisprechen’ ( 67 ). However, I think that
the use ofprophasishere (apart from other considerations which follow below) strongly suggests
that there are good reasons for questioning this ‘aufkl ̈arerische Absicht’. Onprophasisandaitia
see also Lloyd ( 1979 ) 54 n. 31 , and Rawlings ( 1975 ); Nikitas ( 1976 ); Robert ( 1976 ); Hunter ( 1982 )
326 – 31.