On the Sacred Disease 61
However, this extrapolation of a ‘theology’ from the statements about
the divine character of the disease presupposes three generalisations which
are in themselves questionable, and which appear to be inconsistent with
other assertions in the treatise. First, it is ignored that there is a difference
between calling a particular phenomenon ‘divine’ in virtue of a certain
aspect or characteristic, and speaking about ‘the divine’ (to theion)ina
general and abstract way. As a result, it is tacitly assumed that by defining
the divine character of the disease as its being caused by natural factors (or
as its having a nature) the author implicitly confines the range of the divine
to nature or to the regularity which natural phenomena show (as if he not
only said ‘Nature is divine’, but also ‘The divine is identical with nature’).
Not only is such a generalisation of the use of the wordtheiosdangerous in
itself, but it also lacks any textual justification, for in none of the ‘positive’
statements does the writer use the expressionto theionin an abstract way.
In fact, the only instances of this use ofto theionare 1. 25 ( 6. 358 L.), 1. 27
( 6. 358 L.), 1. 31 ( 6. 360 L.) and 1. 45 ( 6. 364 L.), where the expression seems
equivalent tohoi theoi(‘the gods’).^39
Secondly, it is assumed that what the writer says about the divine charac-
ter of diseases holds of every natural phenomenon or event (‘natural’ from
our modern point of view, e.g. earthquakes, solar eclipses, etc.) and that in
his view all these phenomena show a similarly regular pattern of origin and
development and are therefore divine in the same sense as diseases.^40 But,
strictly speaking, the author ofOn the Sacred Diseasemerely denies that
epilepsy has a divine origin in the traditional sense (in whichtheiosimplies
theopemptos, ‘god-sent’), and he asserts that it is not more divine than other
diseases. This need not imply that all other phenomena are divine in this
new sense of ‘being natural’ (panta, ‘all’, in 18. 2 refers tonos ̄emata, ‘diseases’),
nor that a particular phenomenon is divine only in this sense. The author
leaves open the possibility that there are other things which may be the
effect of divine dispensation (in the traditional sense), for example divine
blessings, and the idea of divine dispensation or intervention as such is
nowhere rejected. We may even wonder whether the author really rejects
every appeal to divine healing, for in spite of his self-assurance concerning
the curability of the disease ( 18. 3 – 6 , 6. 394 – 6 L.), he admits that in some
(^39) For other instances of3 see 1. 4 ( 6. 352 L.), where the expression obviously means ‘the divine
character’ (sc. ‘of the disease’); 1. 11 ( 6. 354 L.) is ambiguous:3 may be synonymous with/
, but it may also mean ‘the (allegedly) divine character of the disease’, as in 1. 20 ( 6. 356 L.) and
- 26 ( 6. 358 L.); in 1. 28 ( 6. 360 L.)3 (*is best translated ‘the divine character they talk
about’: there is no question of meaning ‘pious’ here (contra Ducatillon ( 1977 ) 199 ).
(^40) See N ̈orenberg ( 1968 ) 75 : ‘Insofern ist alles bis zu dem Grade gottlich, in dem es an diesen Naturge- ̈
setzen teilhat.’