THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDAIN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA
MISC. APPLIC. NO. 85 OF 1993- DR. J.W. RWANYARARE }
- HAJI BADRU K. WEGULO ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPLICANTS
- MACARIOUS BONSE ASUBO }
-VS-
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL } :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT
BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE F.M.S. EGONDA-NTENDE.
RULING: NO.2
This is an application brought under Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of Uganda seeking certain
declaratory orders on the grounds that certain fundamental rights and freedoms have been
infringed by the Constituent Assembly Election Rules when it was called for hearing, learned
Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Nasa Tumwesige, raised a preliminary objection upon which
this ruling has been made.
Mr. Nasa Tumwesige contended, on behalf of the Attorney General, that this application is
incompetent and not proper before this Court because it does not comply with Section 1 of the
Civil Procedure and Limitation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1969, hereinafter referred to as
Act 20 of 1969. Section 1 of the said Act, he submitted, required, before any suit was filed against
Government, a statutory written notice of 60 days setting out facts constituting the cause of
action. The word suit in this section bore the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2 of the Civil
Procedure Act and in learned Counsel's view included a Notice of Motion as in the present case.
Mr. Nasa Tumwesige submitted that no statutory notice as required by Section 1 of Act 20 of
1969 was served upon the Attorney General in respect of this present application whose main
thrust is against the Constituent Assembly Election Rules 11 and 12. Mr. Tumwesige contended
though, that the Attorney General was served with a Statutory Notice on the 26th November 1992
which notified the Attorney General that the applicants intended to invoke the provisions of
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda against the implementation of
Sections 11(1), 11(2) and 12(1) and 12(10) schedule ill of the Constituent Assembly Bill as it was
likely that those provisions would contravene the applicants rights under Articles 8(2)(b), 18(1)
and 20(1) of the Constitution. Mr. Tumwesige argued that no action was filed by the applicants
following the statutory notice and in his view this statutory notice has since expired, as the
Constituent Assembly Bill was passed into law and assented to by the President on 14/5/1993.
Mr. Tumwesige submitted that the basis of the present application, or, if I understood' him
correctly, that the cause of action in the present application is not the cause of action in the
statutory notice that was served upon the Attorney General. The cause of action in the statutory
notice was the Constituent Assembly Bill and now the cause of action in the present application is
the Constituent Assembly Statute and the accompanying rules.
He referred this Court to the following cases where the lack of a proper notice had been
considered. Alexander Okello -vs- Attorney General Misc. Cause No. 137 of 1992; and Cecilia