Ogwal & 2 Ors. -vs- D.A of Mbale & 3 Ors. He prayed that this application should be dismissed
with costs.
In reply, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Ben Wacha and Mr. Okumu Wengi addressed
court in succession. Mr. Ben Wacha submitted that the Statutory Notice dated 25 th November
1992 and served upon the respondents on 26th November 1992 complied with Section 1 of Act 20
of 1969. He submitted that the substance of the Bill especially those aspects complained of in the
Statutory Notice were the same in substance and also word as in the Constituent Assembly
Statute and the Election Rules. He submitted that the present application is based upon the same
contentions as those in the Statutory Notice.
Learned counsel further submitted that the applicants complained that the implementation of
certain rules contained in the Bill would contravene the applicants' various fundamental rights
and freedoms and the passing of the Bill to the Statute. He submitted that what was important is
that the cause of action, or the facts complained of in the Notice must be substantially the same as
those contained in the suit. He contended that the notice dated 25th November 1992 adequately
informed the Respondents of the action to be taken against them. He referred this court to cases as
Rajabi -vs- State AIR/1973/Bombay 59 and DUTT -vs- East Punjab Province AIR/1958 (Punjab)
351 which considered the objects and sufficiency of a Notice similar to the one required under
Section 1 of the Act 20 of 1969. He also referred this Court to Das -vs- Union of India & Another
AIR [19891 S.C 674 and Singh -vs- Union of India AIR SCR 78t which is quoted therein. He
prayed that this court finds the notice valid and dismisses the preliminary objection accordingly.
Mr. Okumu Wengi submitted that it was enough for the notice to provide sufficient facts. The
notice did not expire unless the suit was barred as a result of time running out after the Notice. He
referred to the cases of Rwakosoro -vs- Attorney General [1979] HCB 24.
Mr. Okumu Wengi further submitted that the implementation of the Bill consisted of 3 parts. (1)
Legislature (2) Executive Action and (3) The administrative/quasi Judicial implementation of the
Statute by the Commission. This, he submitted, was the gist of the cause of action, which is a
continuing cause of action in the form of a Constitutional Tort. The enactment of the Law could
not abate the cause of the action but on the contrary matured the cause of action. He concluded
that the present cause of action appeared futuristic but was a gift of the Constitution itself. He
prayed for the dismissal of the preliminary objection.
At the close of submissions I drew the attention of Mr. Tumwesige to the provision of Articles
22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution and sought to hear counsel's view as to whether section 1 of
the Civil Procedure and Limitation (Misc. Provisions) Act was consistent with the aforesaid
provisions. Mr. Tumwesige replied that Parliament should have enacted a different law under
Article 22(5) of the Constitution but in absence of a different law we must go by what Parliament
has made which is Act 20 of 1969.
It may be useful to set out part 2 of the Statutory Notice which formed the crux of this
preliminary objection. It states:
"(2). The facts constituting the cause of action which arose on the 16th day of October 1992 are
as follows:
On the 16th day of October 1992 the National Resistance Movement NRM Government