An Emerging Identity 83
“Let it come,” roared Tallmadge in response.
Despite the anger and threats of secession, the amendment passed
the House by a vote of 79 to 67. But the Senate, where southerners had
greater numerical strength and friendlier sympathizers, defeated the
measure 31 to 7. With mounting tension and verbal explosions a daily
occurrence in the lower chamber, Speaker Clay feared the worst. “The
words, civil war and disunion,” he told a friend, “are uttered almost
without emotion.”
A possible escape from this predicament occurred when Maine, the
northern province of Massachusetts, petitioned Congress for admis-
sion to the Union as a separate and free state. Thus the admission of
both Missouri and Maine would at least maintain the numerical bal-
ance between free and slave states. As part of the compromise Senator
Jesse Thomas of Illinois offered an amendment to the Missouri en-
abling act which prohibited the extension of slavery into the Louisiana
Territory north of 36 ° 30 ' with the exception of Missouri itself.
And that did the trick. Although the House of Representatives re-
jected a single bill containing all these provisions, it miraculously
passed three separate measures that did the same thing, namely admit
both states and restrict slavery north of 36 ° 30' in the Louisiana Terri-
tory. Southerners did not take exception to the latter provision, recog-
nizing that slavery could not exist in such a northern clime. Presumably
they could take their slaves into the western and southern territories.
“The Southern & Western people talked so much, threatened so loudly,
& predicted such dreadful consequences,” declared Representative
William Plumer of New Hampshire, “... that they fairly frightened
our weak-minded members into an abandonment of their stand against
slavery in the territories.”
Before opposition could be organized against these measures,
Speaker Clay signed them and hurried them to the Senate, where they
received quick passage. John Randolph called for a reconsideration of
the bills, but Clay ruled him out of order and the House sustained his
ruling. It was a close call.
Without question, the Missouri Compromise of 1820 became law
because of the parliamentary skills of Henry Clay. From that moment
on he was known as the “Great Compromiser” or “Great Pacifi cator.”
“The Constitution of the Union was in danger,” wrote Langdon Cheves