claims without evaluating their relative veracity and ignoring the interests supporting the “camps” issuing these
competing claims more apparent (e.g., Demeritt 2006). The reason is that it has become clear that a small number
of influential conservative think tanks, with the help of a modest number of “skeptic” scientists and support from
the fossil fuels industry as well as conservative foundations, have been able to delegitimize mainstream climate
science and derail effective climate change policy in the U.S.--both during environmentally friendly Presidential
administrations (Clinton) and environmentally hostile administrations (G. W. Bush).
In response, a small body of sociological and social science research on what might be called the
“deconstruction,” although “delegitimization” might be more accurate, of climate science by conservative think
tanks and skeptic scientists has been conducted (e.g. Antilla 2005; Boycoff and Boycoff 2004; Lahsen 2008;
McCright and Dunlap 2000; 2003). This research has provided preliminary insights into the counter-claims and
tactics employed by those working to delegitimize the IPCC, climate science and advocates of climate-change
policy, and well as the sources of support for their efforts, but much more work needs to be done and I believe it
should be a priority for future sociological research on climate change.
The reason I make this claim is because if the interests that are opposed to dealing with climate change
continue to be successful in delegitimizing climate change science and advocates for policy-making, our growing
efforts to provide knowledge concerning the causes and impacts of and solutions/adaptations to global warming
will have far less chance of informing intelligent public debates and policy deliberations.
The fact that climate skeptics (by which I mean not just the small number of scientists but their
accomplices in conservative think tanks, conservative media, and the former Bush Administration) have thus far
been incredibly successful is apparent not only from the fact that the U.S. remains an obstacle to international
climate change policy-making, but that U.S. media have portrayed climate science as far more unsettled than
media in other advanced nations (Dispensa and Brulle 2004) and the U.S. public expresses less concern over
global warming than do citizens of other wealthy nations (Brechin 2003).
What do we know: What does Sociology bring to the table for studying the human dimensions of global
climate change?
Constructivist analyses continue to offer many insights into environmental issues (e.g., Hannigan 2006), but
the limits of the relativist approach inherent in strong constructivism have now become apparent (e.g., Benton
2001). Therefore, it should not be difficult for environmental sociologists to supplement the analytical tools of
social constructivism with those of social movements, political sociology and sociology of science in efforts to
“deconstruct” climate change skepticism.
There are many tasks worthy of sociological attention, including but certainly not limited to the
following:
(1) McCright and I (2000) presented the three major counter-claims that skeptics employed to delegitimize
climate science from 1990 to 1997, but new ones have emerged since Kyoto—particularly the claim that
it is “unfair” for the U.S. to cut carbon emissions if China and India do not, and a more recent claim (and
begrudging acknowledgment that global warming is occurring) that we should focus on adapting to global
warming since it cannot be stopped. Examining the evolution of counter-claims, particularly how they are
developed by skeptics in response to the increasing credibility of global warming, should be a priority.