Berlin a mid-March deadline to take action or forfeit their So-
viet cash subsidies in consequence. Suffice it to say that never in
later years, and least of all to subsequent interrogators, did
Göring repeat these claims; nor did he ever produce the docu-
ments “captured maps” locating the electric-power installa-
tions, subway, and transformer stations that were to be blitzed.
(“One map,” he had convincingly claimed, “was found at
[Communist] party headquarters, the other had been cut u p
and distributed to the individual hit squads.”)
The Reichstag fire was the first occasion on which he re-
sorted to such truly monumental falsehoods. But the lies served
their purpose, because they enabled him to lock up three thou-
sand political opponents before election day. Among the Com-
munists to be apprehended were three Bulgarians Vassil
Tanev, Blagoi Popov, and Georgi Dimitrov. Together with Tor-
gler and the luckless Van der Lubbe, they were accused of re-
sponsibility for the Reichstag fire and committed for trial.
Göring reserved his venom particularly for Dimitrov, who was a
leading member of the Comintern (the Soviet directorate of in-
ternational subversion). “Dimitrov,” he snorted years later, “was
a murky figure. Wherever he turned up, you could be sure
there was dirty work afoot.”
When the Reichstag fire trial began at Leipzig late in Sep-
tember , Göring attempted to turn it into a crusade against
the Communists and was humiliated. He appeared in person as
a prosecution witness, clad in brown tunic, riding breeches, and
polished jackboots. He would never forget the resulting con-
frontation with Dimitrov on November .
“My opinion is different,” retorted the Bulgarian at one
stage.
“Logical,” conceded Göring. “But mine’s the one that
counts!”