Even so, Göring’s heart fluttered when he thought that real war
might come. Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, re-
corded in his diary a message from Göring transmitted through
“C,” the head of the British secret service, indicating that he
would like to come in secret to see the prime minister. Prepara-
tions were made to give the staff at Chamberlain’s country house
the day off, but when Göring broached to Hitler for the first
time confidential details of the lines that he had begun stringing
into Whitehall, he was disappointed by the response. “Ja, Gott!”
exclaimed Hitler. “You won’t get anywhere. The English do not
want to go along with us.” A new message went to the British
secret service regretting that Hitler did not think the proposed
flight would be “immediately useful.”
The field marshal did not give up hope entirely. Early on
August , his Berlin staff phoned the Obersalzberg to say that
that the Swede, Dahlerus, was on the other line from Stockholm,
badgering them for a decision about the “Four-Power summit
conference” idea. At : .. Göring had his secretary call
Stockholm back to tell Dahlerus, “The situation has deterio-
rated.” He asked Dahlerus to come to Berlin to meet his “Nor-
wegian friend” (i.e., Göring himself) the next afternoon. Mean-
while Göring flew up to Berlin and called a ministerial meeting
in the seclusion of Carinhall, where he informed the Reich min-
isters, in Hitler’s name, of the grim decision that had been
reached at Berchtesgaden. “It’s been decided,” recorded Darré
in his diary that afternoon, August : “War with Poland!” “You
must keep this top secret,” the field marshal instructed.
“On [August ],” wrote Darré’s Staatssekretär, Herbert
Backe, a few days later,
We were summoned to Carinhall. Göring... in-
formed us in strictest secrecy that it had been resolved