Dahlerus in his hotel suite. “The agreement with Russia,” he dis-
closed, using guarded language, “will have far-reaching conse-
quences. These are of a considerably more comprehensive na-
ture than the published communiqué shows.” Still hoping to
trump Ribbentrop’s ace, he asked the Swedish businessman to
fly to London at once and repeat this to Mr. Chamberlain.
By August , , the slow burning fuse had almost
reached the powder keg. “Efforts,” recorded von Weizsäcker,
Ribbentrop’s Staatssekretär, “are still being made to split the
British from the Poles.” At : .. Hitler hinted to Ambassa-
dor Henderson that he would not take it amiss if Britain waged a
“phony war.” The Forschungsamt heard the ambassador phone
the Foreign Office: “Hitler’s just trying to drive a wedge between
Britain and Poland,” he said. The wiretappers also overheard
Mussolini telephoning Berlin from Rome; his response seemed
satisfactory, and at : .. Hitler issued the order for White,
the invasion of Poland, to begin at dawn. All phone links with
London and Paris were abruptly severed.
Almost at once everything fell apart. At five o’clock the
Forschungsamt detected Count Ciano, the Italian foreign min-
ister, dictating a formal note warning that his country would
not fight. At five-thirty the French ambassador delivered to
Hitler due warning that France would. At : .. the press
agencies reported worse: Britain had just ratified her alliance
with Poland. So the Moscow Pact had not deterred either Lon-
don or Paris at all.
Whitefaced with anger, Hitler ordered General Keitel,
chief of the high command, “ !” and tele-
phoned Field Marshal Göring for advice.
“Is this just temporary?” asked Göring.
“Yes,” admitted Hitler. “Just four or five days until we can
eliminate British intervention.”