ter on the last day of that he handed it to the State De-
partment. (On August , , he died of a heart attack, allegedly
commissioned by “Intrepid,” the head of the British secret serv-
ice in North America.)
Meanwhile Birger Dahlerus returned to Berlin, saw Göring
and the Führer on October , and subsequently informed Lord
Halifax by telegram that he now had more specific German sug-
gestions for the British government to hear. London did not
reply. On October , Göring again took Dahlerus to see Hitler.
The Swede concentrated on the awkward problems presented by
Poland’s frontiers, disarmament, and the need for a change in
Germany’s foreign policy. Hitler hesitated, but after two further
meetings with Göring and the Swedish businessman on the
tenth, he agreed to discuss the Polish question at a later “peace
conference.” They sent Dahlerus off to The Hague to await an
invitation to London; he carried a letter of authority, again
signed by Göring, and memorized the list of proposals a
summit conference to discuss Poland, disarmament, colonies,
and population transfers, after an initial mini-summit of senior
officials like Göring and Ironside. Germany would undertake to
build an Ostwall along the River Vistula in Poland to restrain
the Soviet Army (her own ally). In the private letter to
Dahlerus, Göring reiterated that Hitler profoundly believed
that if the war continued, millions of people would be killed to
no purpose, since the same problems as now would have to be
faced sooner or later.
All of this intense diplomatic activity by Göring failed. In a
BBC broadcast on October , Prime Minister Chamberlain re-
jected the German offer. “Now,” rasped Hitler to Göring, Udet,
and Milch as the latter recorded that day in his diary “you
must produce bombs. The war goes on.” At nine-thirty that
same evening Göring phoned Dahlerus, still waiting at The