Hague to travel on to London. The Reich government, he said,
would not be replying to Chamberlain’s broadcast. “It was a
declaration of war,” he said.
Even so, in the utmost secrecy the Anglo-German dialogue
went on. On October , Göring had a further two-hour con-
versation with Dahlerus, back in Berlin. Again they agreed there
should be an informal mini-summit of senior officials to thrash
out a basis for an armistice. While spurning this approach, the
British made plain in their response that they would negotiate
with a Hitler government provided they received plausible
guarantees against further aggression. Lord Halifax coldly indi-
cated that they would expect major internal changes.
On October , , Göring hinted in an interview with
James D. Mooney, president of General Motors, Berlin, that
Germany was willing to restore a degree of independence to Po-
land and Czechoslovakia. “If we could only reach an agreement
with the British today,” said Göring temptingly, “we’d dump
the Russians and the Japs overboard tomorrow.” According to
Mooney’s own notes, the field marshal asked him “on behalf of
our government” to go over to London and “find out what this
war is all about.” “We have read Chamberlain’s recent speeches,”
Göring added, “and we can’t figure out whether he really wants
to fight or not.”
Vansittart’s brother was European manager of General
Motors, London. After listening to the inquiry that Göring had
made, even he could only give his friend Mooney the oral re-
sponse that London could not trust the present Nazi leadership.
The field marshal himself should act, said Vansittart.
Yellow was now drawing closer, and Göring knew it. On
October , Hitler fixed a date three weeks later for attack. On
the twenty-fifth, Göring had two further urgent sessions with
Birger Dahlerus. The Swede agreed once more “at the field