grams passing between Rome, the Vatican, and Brussels. The
intercepts showed that an unidentified traitor in Berlin had re-
peatedly passed each of Hitler’s deadlines on Yellow to foreign
diplomats. The FA intercepts showed the Italian military attaché
Colonel Efisio Marras tipping off Count Ciano, and Ciano
warning Brussels and The Hague. Further intercepts showed
that the traitor was updating the Belgian and Dutch military
attachés each time Hitler amended the Yellow deadline, on Janu-
ary , , and sometimes within hours of the decision. Fu-
rious at this leak, Hitler briefed Göring and army commander in
chief von Brauchitsch on the twentieth. “I am convinced that we
shall win this war,” he told them, “but we are going to lose it if
we cannot learn to keep our secrets.”
The only concession that Hitler had made to Göring’s air-
force requirements in these weeks was to include Belgium and
Holland in Yellow. He was reluctant to carry the war into neu-
tral territory, and as recently as January he refused Göring
permission to attack shipping in the Downs, squeamishly
pointing out that there might be neutrals among them. But
Jeschonnek, the young chief of air staff, had persuaded Hitler
that he could not reach Britain without the Dutch and Belgian
airfields, so Yellow was extended.
In the interim Field Marshal Göring maneuvered to restore
his prestige, mainly by undermining the other commanders in
chief. “Raeder has got a fine navy. What a pity he’s a church-
goer!” he remarked somewhat hypocritically to Hitler. Sensing
Hitler’s hostility to the clerical influences, Göring had dispensed
with all the air force’s chaplains a few weeks earlier.
He expected a high standard of personal conduct and
brooked no laxity. Writing in May , the air force’s judge-
advocate general Baron Christian von Hammerstein would as-
cribe to him a ruthless determination to maintain discipline.