fateful decisions about his country’s long-term projects. “What-
ever is not crucial to this war,” he dictated, “is to be held over.”
Three days later self-importantly describing himself now
as “prime minister” (omitting the words, “of Prussia”) Göring
discussed with his generals, with the gauleiters of the newly an-
nexed eastern provinces, and with SS Chief Heinrich Himmler
(attending in his new capacity as “Reich commissioner for the
Strengthening of Germandom”) the best ways of exploiting oc-
cupied Czechoslovakia and Poland. He proclaimed that they
must become the new granaries of the Reich; they must be
stripped of church bells and other scrap metals, as well as old
rubber and leather. He told Hans Frank, the governor-general
of rump Poland (the “General-Gouvernement”) that his do-
main would have to fend for itself.
It seems that Göring was aware of Hitler’s geographical so-
lution of the “Jewish problem” bulldozing all of Europe’s Jews
as far eastward as possible. “The General-Gouvernement,” he
reminded Frank at this meeting, “is going to have to accommo-
date this orderly exodus of Jews from Germany and from our
new eastern provinces.” But he did direct that there were to be
no further trainloads of Jews shipped into Poland without his
approval, and on March , , he would issue a specific pro-
hibition in these terms: “I hereby forbid further such deporta-
tions unless I have given my consent and the governor-general
[Hans Frank] is in agreement. I will not tolerate the excuse that
subordinate agencies have permitted such ‘emigrations.’ ”
In Berlin on March , Göring was given the detailed operations
plan for the Nazi attack on Norway. Angry at not having been
consulted, he forbade the subordination of any of his air-force
units to this new theater’s commander. Göring decided to put
his deputy, the rough-tongued General Milch, in command of