was a strategic error, particularly since the fine summer months
were already upon them. He now had about twin-engined
Me s available, but they were proving too cumbersome for
combat; he had some Me s, but these could not reach
London with enough fuel for combat. The British Air Force was,
moreover, showing unwelcome signs of resilience. With each day
that passed it was recovering, yet Hitler was still pussyfooting.
Directing Göring on August to “eliminate the British Air Force
in combat,” he still expressly forbade “terror air raids.”
With a feeling of hopelessness, Göring called his field
marshals back to Carinhall on August and outlined the details
of Eagle Day the opening strike of a three-day grand slam
against the British airfields and radar stations, designed to force
the remaining British squadrons up into lethal air combat. Sev-
eral days passed while he awaited the right three days, and when
he launched Eagle Day on the thirteenth, it went off half-
cocked. As the weather worsened that day, Kesselring recalled
his force, Luftflotte , and the next two days would see only
halfhearted skirmishing. On the fourteenth, Göring heard Hit-
ler say while briefing the newly promoted field marshals at the
Chancellery that Sea Lion, the invasion, was purely a threat “a
last resort, if other pressures [on Britain] fail.” Later that day
the Reichsmarschall angrily summoned Milch and the two other
Luftwaffe field marshals out to Carinhall to express his displeas-
ure at the air offensive’s failure.
Air-crew morale was spiraling downward like an He
bomber with its tailplane shot away. The Luftwaffe was now
fighting a determined enemy in his own skies. The Me was
being mauled. The Ju was defective. Mass fire raids on Lon-
don were still denied them. Repeating Hitler’s words to the
Luftwaffe that day, August , Göring’s face adopted the familiar
“angry lion” look. Milch noted Hitler’s bombing embargoes in