would arrive in time to restore supremacy. Swift and invulner-
able, the Ar jet was effortlessly photographing the Allied
supply beaches and battlefields in the west. And now the much-
vaunted, much-criticized jet-bomber squadrons were screaming
into action against the Allies too. Operated by KG, the first Me
jet bombers were punishing their troop concentrations
around Nijmegen. In relaxation of Hitler’s rigid veto, an ex-
perimental jet-fighter squadron with the first fifty Me jet
fighters would begin operations in mid-October from bases at
Achmer and Hesepe. Altogether Göring now had around
thirty-seven hundred fighter planes, but all these operations
were severely curtailed by dwindling fuel, deficient training, and
lowering morale.
Nowhere was morale lower than in the much-maligned air
staff. On October , Brauchitsch brought to Carinhall a gloomy
memorandum that General Kreipe had written on “Air Warfare
in ,” morbidly depicting a Reich hopelessly encircled by su-
perior air forces. Göring sent for Kreipe on the twelfth and
tossed the document onto the table. “It’s defeatist!” he screamed.
“It smacks of slide rule and general staff. I’m sorely disappointed
in you. Now you too are stabbing me in the back! You’ve lost
faith in victory. Aren’t you aware that the Führer has forbidden
the general staff ever to assess our overall situation? If I didn’t
hold you in such esteem I’d have to show this drivel to the
Führer and that would be the end of you.”
He tore the paper in two, and threw the halves across the
table. Kreipe’s usefulness had come to an end, but whom could
the Reichsmarschall now appoint as chief of air staff?
Still squirming at the name of Koller, he sent for General
Kurt Pflugbeil, commanding Luftflotte on the Baltic coast.
Pflugbeil was untainted by general-staff training. Even so, he
turned down the job.