“The So-called Council of State” 1649–1652ists in England, to unite against the illegal new republic and place Charles II on his
rightful throne.
As he rose to the defense of the new republic against Salmasius, Milton had to
confront directly the questionable status of an unrepresentative government founded
on revolution and military force, an issue sharply focused by the bitter and divisive
Engagement Controversy. The government, in an effort to secure the loyalty of its
public servants, required their subscription to this formula: “I do declare and prom-
ise that I will be true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England as the same is
now established, without a King or House of Lords.”^68 On October 11, 1649 all
members of parliament were required to sign the Engagement, and soon after all
officers and servicemen in the army and navy, all judges and officials of courts of
law, all who held municipal posts, all graduates and officers of the universities, all
masters and scholars of the colleges, all ministers admitted to a benefice, and all state
pensioners. On January 2, 1650 it was required of citizens generally, with voting
rights and access to the courts denied to those who refused.^69 Though the Engage-
ment was not an oath and did not (as some had wanted) require approval of the
regicide, it proved counterproductive. Many Presbyterians (including Fairfax, the
commander-in-chief of the Commonwealth’s army) refused to sign it on grounds
of conscience, citing the oath they swore in the Solemn League and Covenant to
uphold the government of king, lords, and commons. Levellers believed the present
government unrepresentative and therefore illegal. Royalists did not want to be on
record with such a pledge, should the political winds shift. Algernon Sidney was
prescient in his protest to the council “that such a test would prove a snare to many
an honest man, but every knave would slip through it.”^70 Royalist polemics urged
just such “knavish” behavior: sign, with the firm intention of breaking the illegal
promise when circumstances allowed. John Dury and Marchamont Nedham pro-
duced Hobbesian arguments for signing: citizens have the duty and responsibility to
secure civil peace by giving allegiance to whatever powers God has established over
them.^71 Nedham, in The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated, cites Roman
historians and Machiavelli on the benefits of a republic but offers an unvarnished
Machiavellian account of the origins of government – not social compact but bla-
tant force: “the Power of the Sword is, and ever hath been the foundation of all
Titles to Government.” And, as a corollary, “A Government erected by a Prevail-
ing Part of the people, is as valid De Jure, as if it had the ratifying Consent of the
whole.”^72 Milton’s tracts did not address the Engagement Controversy directly but,
while he recognized victory on the battlefield as usually a sign of divine favor, he
based the government’s claim to allegiance not on force but on the right of good
men who love liberty to represent the whole people. In a state letter to Hamburg
(January 4, 1650) he defended the Engagement in terms that probably reflect his
own as well as the council’s position, as a legitimate demand of allegiance from
those who hold office in the government or enjoy its benefits (CPW V.2, 496–8).
Another source of disunity and danger was the republic’s increasingly obstreper-