“The So-called Council of State” 1649–1652Also, Milton now finds much more evidence in the gospels of the divine preference
for republicanism. He describes Christ as a “Liberator” propounding a version of
liberation theology as he urges his followers to win political freedom and live by
republican principles. He reads 1 Corinthians 7:21–5 (“If you can become free,
then use your freedom. You are bought for a price; be not the slaves of men”) as
encouraging “our worthy struggle for freedom” both religious and political, and as
placing “our political freedom on a firm foundation” (374–5). He cites to the same
purpose Christ’s reprimand to the sons of Zebedee when they sought high rank in
his kingdom (Matthew 20:20–1): “the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion
over them; and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be
so among you... whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.”
That text proves that “Amongst Christians... there will either be no king at all, or
else one who is the servant of all; for clearly one cannot wish to dominate and
remain a Christian” (378–9). And in place of the royalist analogy Salmasius so often
invokes between divine and human kingship, Milton asserts a flat disjunction, claim-
ing that earthly kingship belongs to Christ alone, at the Millennium: “who, in fact,
is worthy of holding on earth power like that of God but some person who far
surpasses all others and even resembles God in goodness and wisdom? The only
such person, as I believe, is the son of God whose coming we look for” (427–8).
Reiterating his long-standing belief that “the law of God does most closely agree
with the law of nature” (422), Milton insists that the law of nature holds forth these
same principles of popular sovereignty and republicanism. Like Filmer, Salmasius
reads the law of nature as mandating absolute power in the king and forbidding
rebellion against him on the ground that the king has the powers of the father of a
family.^183 But Milton proclaims this analogy also to be entirely false: “Our fathers
begot us, but our kings did not, and it is we, rather, who created kings.” Moreover,
even paternal power is not absolute: “we do not endure even a father who is tyran-
nical” (327). Reprising the arguments of Tenure, he insists, against both Salmasius
and Hobbes,^184 that the people’s grant of power to any king or magistrate is always
on trust and revocable, since “To grant to any mortal power over one’s self on
stronger terms than a trust would be the height of madness” (459) and would amount
to enslaving oneself. The regicide was justified by the law of nature that subjects the
king to law and justice like any other person, and by Salus Populi, “that law of
Nature and of God which holds that whatever is for the safety of the state is right
and just” (317–18). Also, nature, like Aristotle, dictates that forms of government
should be suited to the character of the people. A king could conceivably be the
“natural” choice if he is “far superior” to all others in wisdom and virtue: Milton
speculates that Julius Caesar may have been such a man (449) and he will later
conclude that Cromwell probably is. But England should look rather to nature’s
norm: “where there are many equals, and in most states there are very many, I hold
they should rule alike and in turn” (366–7).
In the category of secular history, Milton counters Salmasius’s assertion that