Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

behavior, is inherently pathological, the implications

are legion. In their determinations of culpability, the

courts are thus wise to proceed with caution. As

behavioral science research and technology advance,

it is likely that the critical mass of the data will, ulti-

mately, persuade.

Candice A. Skrapec

See also Criminal Responsibility, Assessment of; Forensic

Assessment; Mens Rea and Actus Reus; Psychopathy;

Psychotic Disorders

Further Readings

Hare, R. D. (1993). Without conscience: The disturbing

world of the psychopaths among us.New York: Pocket

Books.

Raine, A. (1993). The psychopathology of crime: Criminal

behavior as a clinical disorder.New York: Academic

Press.

Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. (1990). Emotional intelligence.

Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 9(3), 185–211.

Strueber, D., Lueck, M., & Roth, G. (2006, December). The

violent brain. Scientific American,pp. 20–27.

Teicher, M. H. (2002, March). Scars that won’t heal: The

neurobiology of child abuse. Scientific American,pp. 68–75.

Widom, C. S. (1989). The cycle of violence. Science,

244,160–166.

CRIMINALRESPONSIBILITY,

ASSESSMENT OF

Mental health professionals are frequently asked to eval-

uate criminal defendants to assist the courts in determin-

ing whether those individuals may have been legally

insane (i.e., not criminally responsible) at the time of

their crimes. This entry discusses the legal concept of

and criteria for insanity, as well as the challenges that

forensic experts face in conducting these evaluations.

In contemporary Western society, prohibited behav-

iors are typically codified in the criminal law, and most

citizens are held to be responsible to obey these laws.

Individuals who violate the law may be prosecuted and,

if convicted, punished for their behavior. Such individ-

uals are said to be “criminally responsible,” a label that

reflects the moral and legal judgment that the person

had neither a justification nor an excuse for his or her

behavior, should have known better, and must endure

the punishment as a corrective mechanism intended to

discourage the recurrence of such behavior.

As the last sentence indicates, behavior that on its

face appears to be criminal may in some circumstances

not warrant the legal and moral conclusion that the actor

is “guilty” or “criminally responsible.” For example,

under most circumstances, it is unlawful to take the life

of another person, yet doing so in “self-defense” (the

victim was threatening the life of the actor) may consti-

tute a justification that precludes a finding of guilt.

Similarly, taking money from another person (robbery),

when performed under duress (a third-party threatens to

kill the actor’s child unless the money is taken), may be

seen as justified because of the greater harm (death of

the child) that was avoided by robbing the victim.

There are other individuals, or classes of individ-

uals, who may be exempt or excused from judgments

of “criminally responsible,” not because of extraor-

dinary or justifying circumstances, but because of

individual characteristics or features that render

them, in society’s eyes, incapable of making the

appropriate moral and legal judgments required to

behave appropriately and (perhaps also) incapable

from benefiting from punishment as a corrective

measure. For our purposes, two such classes of indi-

viduals will be mentioned, both of which have been

recognized in Western cultures, literally for cen-

turies, as inappropriate targets for judgments of

moral and legal culpability.

The first class of individuals is children, who,

because of youthful age, lack of life experience, and

mental or emotional immaturity, are considered not

accountable as moral actors in the way that adults are

held accountable for their behavior. Although excep-

tional cases may be found, the law has generally con-

sidered it an unrebuttable assumptionthat children at

the age of 7 years and younger may not be held to

adult standards of criminal responsibility, whereas

there is a rebuttable assumptionthat children between

the ages of 7 and 14 years are not moral agents to be

held to adult standards of criminal responsibility.

The second group or class of individuals, and the

one of primary focus here, comprises individuals with

significant mental disorders whose symptomatology

contributes to their “criminal behavior” in specific

ways that society deems excuses them from moral

culpability (criminal responsibility). In more common

legal parlance, these individuals are considered

“legally insane” or “not guilty by reason of insanity.”

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