evidence, it did not address the issue of nonscientific
expert testimony. A later Supreme Court case,Kumho
Tire Company v. Carmichael (1999), answered the
question of whether the Daubert standards should
apply to nonscientific testimony as well. In this case, a
tire on Patrick Carmichael’s minivan failed, causing
Carmichael to lose control of the car, resulting in a car
accident, which resulted in serious injuries and one
death. Carmichael then brought suit against Kumho
Tire Co., alleging that the tire had been defective.
Carmichael wished to introduce testimony from an
expert in tire failure analysis to show that the blowout
was due to a tire defect rather than age or overuse. The
District Court refused to admit the expert testimony,
citing that the testimony failed to meet the standards set
forth in FRE 702 or the reliability factors put forth in
Daubert.
The Eleventh Circuit Court reversed the decision,
stating that the U.S. District Court was mistaken in its
application of the Daubertreliability standard to non-
scientific testimony. The Circuit Court ruled that the
expert testimony at issue relied on experience-based
rather than scientific knowledge, which was outside
the scope of Daubert.Therefore, the Circuit Court
ruled that the admissibility of the expert testimony
had to be reconsidered under Rule 702 instead.
However, the United States Supreme Court disagreed
with the Circuit Court when it reviewed and reversed
the decision. The Court decided that judges’ gate-
keeping responsibility outlined in Rule 702 applied to
specialized and technical knowledge, in addition to
the previous application to scientific knowledge.
Thus judges were responsible for determining the rel-
evance and reliability of nonscientific expert testi-
mony as well as scientific testimony. According to the
Court, the FRE 702 and 703 did not distinguish
between scientific and nonscientific expert testimony
and allows experts testifying on technical and spe-
cialized topics, as they do to scientific experts, the
same latitude in presenting their opinions—latitude
that is not granted to nonexpert witnesses. The Court
also recognized the difficulty in distinguishing scien-
tific from technical or specialized knowledge,
because experts often have more than one type of
knowledge to offer.
The Court then considered how judges should
assess the reliability of these other types of expert
knowledge, ruling that the Daubertfactors could be
used to evaluate expert testimony based on special-
ized and technical knowledge just as they can beused to evaluate scientific expert testimony.
However, the Court reemphasized the statement in
Daubertthat the four factors outlined in that case
were not an exhaustive list of criteria and reaffirmed
the power of judges to consider other factors when
determining admissibility. The Court noted that not
all types of expert testimony can be judged solely on
the basis of those four factors, as they do not always
apply, but also recognized that they can apply to non-
scientific knowledge, such as experientially based
knowledge, as well. Therefore, they do not need to
be applied exclusively, or even considered at all, in
every case. The Court noted that judges have the
same broad freedom in determining how to assess
reliability of expert testimony as they enjoy in appel-
late review of their admission decisions as deter-
mined by Joiner. Kumhoagain reaffirmed judges’
discretionary authority when evaluating expert testi-
mony and deciding its admissibility.Effects of Changing Standards on
the Admissibility of Expert Evidence
Given the shift in standards, it was expected that rates
of admissibility for scientific testimony might be
affected. Some scholars argued that, under Daubert,it
was now possible for novel scientific evidence that
was based on reliable and valid methods, but had not
yet had time to gain general acceptance, to be admit-
ted. This change would result in an increase in the
rates of admission for scientific testimony. Other
scholars argued that some generally accepted findings
were based on unreliable methods and could now be
challenged, resulting in a decrease in the admissibility
of some types of evidence. Research on admissibility
decisions pre- and post-Daubert has shown that the
overall rates of admission were not significantly
affected by Daubert.In contrast, the shift in standards
did have an impact on the criteria used by judges to
evaluate the admissibility of scientific testimony.
Judges were less likely to rely on general acceptance
or the Fryestandard after Daubertand more likely to
rely on Daubert criteria (e.g., peer review, falsifiabil-
ity, error rates) to justify their admissibility decisions
than they were before Daubert.Despite this increase
in the use of Daubertcriteria to justify admissibility
decisions, after the decision, the best predictor of
whether judges ruled to admit expert testimony were
issues related to the FRE rather than the Daubert
criteria or general acceptance.274 ———Expert Psychological Testimony, Admissibility StandardsE-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:42 PM Page 274