Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

into their decisions when they are presented with a

case description that includes the relevant eyewitness

factors (e.g., cross-race effect). In one of the few

investigations of this question, Brian Cutler and col-

leagues found that even when jurors had specific

knowledge of the limitations of eyewitness identifica-

tion, the information was not well integrated into their

decision making. Similarly, other researchers have

recently found that mock jurors who have demonstra-

bly more knowledge than others do not necessarily

demonstrate sensitivity to the eyewitness factors rele-

vant to a case. In summary, researchers have con-

cluded that there is little evidence that the existing

knowledge held by mock jurors is readily incorpo-

rated into their decisions regarding a written vignette.

Finally, Brian Cutler and colleagues have also

attempted to improve levels of mock juror knowledge

through the presentation of expert testimony prior to

making judgments about cases in which eyewitness

identification factors are manipulated. This research

has been completed in laboratory settings with mock

jurors, and as a result, its generalizability to court-

rooms and jury deliberations is unknown. Nonetheless,

these studies suggest that whereas the presentation of

relevant expert testimony may increase low levels of

juror knowledge or awareness of relevant eyewitness

factors, the integration of this knowledge into juror

decision making may or may not be successful,

depending on the particular variables of interest. Thus,

if expert testimony is recommended as a safeguard

against weak juror understanding of eyewitness fac-

tors, it does not appear to be particularly effective.

Potential Difficulties With

Evaluations of Lay Knowledge

A number of issues are relevant to the reliability and

validity of the kinds of assessments of lay belief

described above. First, in a temporal sense, public sur-

vey results have limited validity because public beliefs

and knowledge will change over time. These changes

likely result from improved scientific understanding

and its dissemination to the general public through var-

ious media and by integration into formal education.

Second, considerably more research is required to

determine the extent to which survey and mock trial

responses accurately reflect the beliefs of jury-eligible

participants. This issue concerns the sensitivity and

reliability of the various assessment procedures

described above and the extent to which lay responses

may be directly compared with those of experts. For

example, even with ostensibly identical foci of

the questions posed to experts and the public, the

response options provided have not been identical.

Similarly, if statements are written by experts and

offered without change to survey participants, on what

basis can we argue that the public understands the

statements in a manner similar to that of the experts?

Furthermore, the translation of the expert items into

meaningful statements for lay respondents is difficult

and suggests that real understanding of these issues by

jurors (and by judges, trial counsel, and experts alike)

will only be gained with more in-depth interviews,

open-ended questions, and the use of techniques that

can assess response consistency within individuals

across both question formats and time.

A third question is whether the samples surveyed to

date actually represent the members of a population of

individuals who may be called for jury duty and who

serve as jurors. Many studies have relied on undergrad-

uate students, albeit jury-eligible in most cases, but who

arguably are not representative of actual jurors: In fact,

university students infrequently serve on actual juries.

Additionally, even those studies in which community

samples were included, nonetheless, suffer from weak

representativeness because there may be important

demographic and attitudinal differences between com-

munity members who, once called, appear versus those

who fail to appear for jury duty. A more compelling

approach would be to collect data from actual jurors

who have participated in trials or to survey community

members who have been called and appear for jury duty

but have yet to be assigned to a particular case.

In summary, a fairly consistent description of juror

knowledge emerges across a wide variety of assess-

ment methods; specifically, jurors appear to have lim-

ited understanding of eyewitness issues and research

findings.

J. Don Read and Sarah L. Desmarais

See also Cognitive Interview; Confidence in Identifications;

Cross-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification; Elderly

Eyewitnesses; Estimator and System Variables in

Eyewitness Identification; Expert Psychological

Testimony; Expert Psychological Testimony on

Eyewitness Identification; Exposure Time and Eyewitness

Memory; Eyewitness Memory; Instructions to the

Witness; Retention Interval and Eyewitness Memory;

Simultaneous and Sequential Lineup Presentation;

Weapon Focus

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