Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

an individual’s mental state is irrelevant to this

inquiry. In contrast, some states permit the introduc-

tion of evidence of mental disorder whenever it is log-

ically relevant to rebut the specific or subjective mens

rea requirement (i.e., the state of mind associated with

a specific-intent crime). If this argument (sometimes

called diminished capacity) is successful, the usual

result is that the defendant will only face conviction of

a lesser included offense that merely requires a show-

ing of general or objective intent. Prosecutors who

charge a defendant with a specific-intent crime will

frequently also charge the defendant with a general-

intent crime as a means to enable them to impose

some criminal sanction on the defendant should they

be unable to convince the judge or jury that the requi-

site specific intent was present at the time of the

crime. The use of evidence of a mental disorder dis-

counting the presence of specific intent differs from

the use of evidence of mental disorder for an insanity

defense in that the former can result in an uncondi-

tional acquittal that does not lead to the civil commit-

ment and treatment typically associated with the

latter. This result is the same as that which results

from a lack of actus reus because, as noted above,

both mens rea and actus reus are elements of the crime

that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and if

they cannot be proven the defendant will be exoner-

ated of the charged crime. The insanity defense, in

contrast, can excuse a defendant from punishment but

does not exonerate him or her.

Courts and legislatures have often restricted the use

of expert testimony concerning mental disorders. For

example, some jurisdictions do not permit testimony

regarding any evidence of a mental disorder except

when it is being used to support an insanity defense.

This position was upheld in Clark v. Arizona(2006),

in which the Supreme Court ruled that Arizona’s deci-

sion to restrict evidence of a mental disorder to insan-

ity claims only, thus not admitting such evidence

when it could be used to address mens rea, does not

violate due process. Nevertheless, even in those states

where expert testimony relating to mens rea cannot be

admitted in court, the information about a defendant’s

mental state could still be used in plea negotiations

and at sentencing.

Kamela K. Nelan and

Thomas L. Hafemeister

See alsoAutomatism; Criminal Responsibility, Defenses and

Standards; Expert Psychological Testimony, Admissibility

Standards; Insanity Defense, Juries and

Further Readings

Clark v. Arizona,126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).

Morse, S. J. (2003). Diminished rationality, diminished

responsibility. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law,

1,289–308.

Symposium. (1994). Act and crime. University of

Pennsylvania Law Review, 142,1443–1890.

MENTAL HEALTHCOURTS

Mental health courts are specialty criminal courts with

a separate docket to deal with mentally ill persons,

who are disproportionately arrested and incarcerated.

Established by local court and criminal justice officials

who recognized that traditional prosecution and pun-

ishment were not effective deterrents with this popula-

tion, these courts divert mentally ill defendants into

community treatment with services to reduce repeat

offending, jail and prison crowding, court workload,

and criminal justice costs. To participate, defendants

must voluntarily agree to follow a treatment regimen

and to be monitored. Proceedings are nonadversarial

with participants—including judges, defense and pros-

ecuting attorneys, criminal justice officers, mental

health practitioners, and other service providers—

functioning as a team to provide direction, encourage-

ment, rewards, and sanctions to defendants.

Origins of Mental Health Courts

In the 1960s, shortly after state mental hospitals began

abandoning their role of providing long-term placement

for persons with mental illness, criminalization accom-

panying this change was reported—large numbers of

deinstitutionalized persons were being arrested and

jailed. This process has continued to the point that some

metropolitan jails house more persons with mental ill-

ness than any state mental hospital on any given day.

Most charges against persons with mental illness

are not serious, being predominantly nuisance and

survival offenses and offenses deriving from misuse

of alcohol and illegal drugs. Although only a small

proportion of their offenses are propelled by psychi-

atric symptoms, mental illness indirectly affects

offending because it generates disadvantages in the

ability to function and cope with difficult situations,

which lead to offending. Mental health treatment

and services can improve functioning and coping to

488 ———Mental Health Courts

M-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:43 PM Page 488