6

STRUCTURE? WHAT STRUCTURE?

1

Nicholas Onuf

Kenneth Waltz’s name is irrevocably associated with the term structure. Waltz’s
theory of international politics, as expounded in the 1970s, is a systemic theory and,
for that reason, a structural theory.^2 His systemic perspective quickly came to be
known asstructural realism, and Waltz has himself adopted this label.^3 In an act of
sublime flattery, one of Waltz’s most strident critics, Alexander Wendt, went so far
as to describe constructivism in the field of International Relations (IR) ‘as a kind
of “structural idealism”’.^4 In this chapter, I suggest that Waltz’s theory also bears
describing as a kind of structural idealism, though hardly the kind that Wendt has
espoused. Appropriately developed, Waltz’s conception of structure suits, even
supports, a strong version of constructivist social theory.
More precisely, I take Waltz’s theory to be grounded in a philosophical position
closer to Immanuel Kant’s than to the philosophical realism that Wendt has
promoted. Philosophical realismand its variants scientific realismand critical realism(not
be confused with political realism) start with the claim that ‘the world is independent
of the mind and language of individual observers’.^5 According to Michael Devitt (a
realist himself), modern philosophical constructivism draws on two ideas that are
from Kant and one that is not.

Constructivism The only independent reality is beyond the reach of our

knowledge and language. A known world is partly constructed by the imposi-

tion of concepts. These concepts differ from (linguistic, social, scientific, etc.)

group to group, and hence the worlds of groups differ. Each such world differs

only relative to an imposition of concepts.^6

Constructivism is typically if unhelpfully described as philosophically idealist.
The updated, post-Kantian constructivism defended in these pages, and with it
the constructivist social theory that I prefer, draws on Aristotle to avoid the