21 Waltz, TIP, p. 82. In Handbook, pp. 46–47, Waltz had put forward a ‘two-part definition
of structure’, effectively combining the second and third parts of the later definition.
22 Waltz, TIP, pp. 82, 88.
23 Waltz, TIP, pp. 93–97.
24 Waltz, Handbook, p. 46.
25 This omission is particularly telling in Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Paradigm
lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics’, European Journal of International Relations,
11(1), 2005, pp. 9–61. Rather than taking advantage of Waltz’s discussion of models,
they introduced the concept of analytical systems. Such systems ‘are not realin an
ontological sense – for the most part there is no real distinction between personalities,
culture and social systems, and in reality all will affect action and order’ (p. 17, their
emphasis). As I hope to make clear, analytical systems are models, and conversely all
models are analytical in this sense. Yet Waltz quite properly reserved the term analysis
and its cognates for the procedure of ‘reducing the entity to its discrete parts and
examining their properties and connections’ (Handbook, p. 44; TIP, p. 39). Systemic
models are notreductive, or analytical, in Waltz’s sense.
26 Waltz, Handbook, p. 8; TIP, pp. 6–7, omits the second sentence in this passage and slightly
alters the first sentence in the remainder.
27 Waltz, Handbook, pp. 8–9; TIP, p. 7.
28 Waltz, Handbook, p. 9; TIP, p. 7.
29 ‘Theories do construct areality, but no one can say it ever is thereality’. TIP, p. 9.
30 Waltz, TIP, p. 10.
31 Waltz, TIP, p. 10. It should be clear that, for Waltz, the familiar expression ‘naked eye’
is not to be taken literally, as if we do notsubject perceptions to cognitive processing
when we arenot specifically forming a theory. As will become clear below, Waltz’s
position is quite the converse: we are envisioning patterns whatever we do.
32 Waltz, TIP, p. 73, where Waltz considered ‘structures as causes’.
33 Waltz, TIP, pp. 99–101; Morton A. Kaplan,Toward Professionalism in International Theory:
Macrosystem Analysis(New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 36–48.
34 See Patrick James, International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002), pp. 44–49, for a good summary.
35 See James, International Relations and Scientific Progress, pp. 66–116.
36 For a critical treatment of the Humean view of causality and its influence on IR, see Milja
Kurki,Causation in International Relations.
37 Waltz, Handbook, p. 3; TIP, p. 5.
38 Waltz, Handbook, p. 4; TIP, p. 6.
39 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, trans. W. D. Ross, 987a29–992a23, quoting 991a20–1, in
Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), II, pp. 1561–8, at 1566. The Greek text is available online at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi–bin/ptext?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0051.
40 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 1013a26, in Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, II, p. 1600;
‘the form or the archetype, i.e. the definition of the essence, and its genera, are called
causes’. Aristotle, Physics, II, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, 194b27–8, in Barnes,
The Complete Works of Aristotle, I, p. 332.
41 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 1033b8, in Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, II, p. 1632.
42 Aristotle’s discussion of ‘why some things are produced spontaneously as well as by art’
is tautological: in some instances matter ‘can move itself’ while in other instances it ‘is
incapable of this’; form drops out of the discussion. Metaphysics, VII, 1034a9–21, in
Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, II, pp. 1632–33.
43 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 1033b8–10, in Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, II,
p. 1632; emphasis in translation.
44 Waltz, TIP, p. 58.
45 Waltz’s, Handbook, pp. 56–64;TIP, 50–59; Kaplan, Toward Professionalism in International
Theory, pp. 42–48.
104 Structure? What structure?